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“Ad hoc procedure” seems like an oxymoron. A traditional model of the civil jus-
tice system depicts courts deciding cases using impartial procedures that are defined
in advance of specific disputes. This model reflects a process-based account of the
rule of law in which the process through which laws are made helps to ensure that
lawmakers act in the public interest. Judgments produced using procedures
promulgated in advance of specific disputes are legitimate because they are the
product of fair rules of play designed in a manner that is the opposite of ad hoc.
Actual litigation frequently reveals the inadequacy of procedures created according
to this traditional model. To fix the procedural problems that arise in such cases,
litigants, judges, lawyers, and legislatures can design procedure on the fly, changing
the “rules of the road” as the case proceeds. Ad hoc procedure-making allows the
civil justice system to function when ordinary procedure fails, but it challenges the
rule-of-law values reflected in the traditional model of procedural design. Instead of
being created by lawmakers who operate behind a veil of ignorance, ad hoc proce-
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dure is made by actors seeking specific outcomes in pending cases. The circum-
stances in which ad hoc procedure is created raise concerns about lawmakers’
motivations, the transaction costs of one-off procedural interventions, the wisdom
and fairness of those interventions, and the separation of powers.
This Article introduces the phenomenon of ad hoc procedure and considers its
place in a world where much procedure continues to be made through the tradi-
tional model. Focusing on ad hoc procedural statutes, the Article contends that such
statutes’ legitimacy—or lack thereof—depends on different factors than ordinary
civil procedure. Unable to claim legitimacy from the circumstances in which it is
crafted, ad hoc procedural legislation must instead derive legitimacy from the need
to address a procedural problem and the effort to produce substantively just
outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 1972, a short article on page fifty of the New York
Times noted an AFL-CIO press conference held to call attention to a
new cancer “afflicting an increasing number of asbestos plant workers
and their families.”1 According to a doctor who spoke at the press
conference, “the cancer, mesothelioma, was so rare that some medical
books did not recognize its existence as recently as two years ago.”2
Eighteen months after the Times story, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict awarding $79,436.24 to the wife of an insulation worker
who died from mesothelioma caused by asbestos in the defendants’
products.3
The Fifth Circuit’s decision spurred plaintiffs’ lawyers to sign up
thousands of clients, who in turn filed thousands of claims seeking
compensation for asbestos-related injuries.4 Neither state nor federal
courts were equipped to handle litigation of this size and complexity.
The plaintiffs’ claims turned on individualized issues of causation and
damages that prevented them from being resolved through conven-
1 Asbestos Jobs Tied to Cancer Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1972, at 50.
2 Id.
3 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973).
4 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 22–24 (2005).
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 6 Side B      10/12/2017   08:00:42
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 6 Side B      10/12/2017   08:00:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU401.txt unknown Seq: 4 10-OCT-17 14:40
770 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:767
tional forms of aggregate litigation.5 Nor could defendants put a
ceiling on their liability through aggregate settlements, given the long
latency period for asbestos-related cancers.6
The lack of workable mechanisms for resolving the flood of
asbestos claims affected each of the civil justice system’s constituen-
cies. Many plaintiffs with lethal asbestos-caused cancers died uncer-
tain whether their claims would be paid.7 Defendants could not
remove asbestos liabilities from their balance sheets or expand into
new areas of business because of the “overhang” of asbestos litiga-
tion.8 Judges failed to discharge their basic obligation to resolve cases
within their jurisdiction.
Even imaginative applications of ordinary procedural tools
proved inadequate. In 1997, the Supreme Court in Amchem Products
v. Windsor rejected an attempt to redirect asbestos claims to a quasi-
administrative compensation scheme created through a class action
settlement certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).9 The problem, the
Court reasoned, was that plaintiffs currently suffering from asbestos-
related diseases could not represent those who had been exposed to
asbestos but had yet to become ill.10 In Rule 23(b)(3) terms, no
“[common] question[ ] . . . predominate[d] over any questions
affecting only individual [class] members” in those two groups to sup-
port certification.11 With class litigation unable to deliver peace, filings
5 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 311 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a trial
plan developed by Judge Robert Parker that proposed to group plaintiffs’ claims into
bundles and assign claim values based on statistical averages); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893
F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an earlier plan developed by Judge Parker).
6 By 1994, more than 24,000 asbestos-related claims were pending in federal and state
courts. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at 71 tbl.4.1. Epidemiologists estimated that 312,380
asbestos-related deaths would occur before 2004, one quarter of which would be from
mesothelioma. Id. at 15.
7 See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar
Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 384 (1993).
8 The Need for Supplemental Permanent Injunctions in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 44
(1993) [hereinafter Senate Manville Hearings] (statement of Robert B. Steinberg, Selected
Counsel for the Beneficiaries, Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust); see also
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at 45–47 (describing asbestos litigation’s impacts on
defendant companies’ finances and the settlements to which those pressures led).
9 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997).
10 Id. at 625–27.
11 Id. at 622 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). The Amchem settlement applied to any
individual who was exposed to asbestos in the workplace before 1993 and to family
members of such individuals—a class that “encompasse[d] hundreds of thousands, perhaps
millions, of individuals.” Id. at 597. It applied both to individuals currently suffering an
asbestos-related illness (“present” claimants) and to individuals who were exposed to
asbestos but had yet to become ill (“future” claimants). Id. at 601. The settling defendants,
a consortium that included most of the major U.S. asbestos manufacturers, agreed to
establish a $1.3 billion fund to compensate individuals who developed an asbestos-related
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continued apace. On New Year’s Eve 2009, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where federal-court asbestos
cases were consolidated for pretrial management before Judge
Charles R. Weiner,12 reported that 52,044 asbestos cases were pending
on its docket.13 Legal scholars spoke of a “never-ending asbestos
crisis.”14
One manufacturer, however, overcame the crisis. While the
Amchem lawyers had been working to devise a global class action set-
tlement, the company that had once been the world’s largest asbestos
manufacturer, Johns-Manville Corporation (Manville), entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.15 Temporarily protected from liti-
gation by the automatic stay, Manville, together with lawyers for
asbestos plaintiffs and a “representative of . . . future claimants”
appointed by the bankruptcy court to represent individuals who had
yet to become ill, devised a new legal structure to address the com-
pany’s asbestos liabilities.16 A freestanding trust, funded with the
majority of the reorganized company’s common stock, would provide
an “evergreen” source of funding for asbestos claims.17 The bank-
ruptcy and district courts issued a “channeling injunction” that redi-
rected all asbestos claims against “new Manville” to the personal
injury trust,18 enabling the company to generate profits free of the
pressure of asbestos litigation. But legal uncertainty over the trust
structure—including doubts about the courts’ authority to issue such
an injunction—caused financial markets and, crucially, Manville’s
insurers, to doubt the plan’s viability.19 In response, Manville’s man-
illness. Id. at 633 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Individuals who
developed such a disease would be entitled to compensation, keyed to the type of disease
and the individual claimant’s characteristics, upon submitting satisfactory medical
documentation. Id. at 603–04. In exchange, every member of the entire plaintiff class—
whether or not presently injured—gave up his or her right to pursue claims in the tort
system except in limited circumstances. Id. at 604–05.
12 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422–24 (J.P.M.L.
1991) (transferring asbestos cases to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
13 December 2016 MDL 875 Casewide Statistical Breakdown, In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL-875 (J.P.M.L. E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL875/MDL-875.report.dec31.2016.pdf.
14 Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos
Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1, 1 (2001).
15 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 7 F.3d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1993).
16 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751–52, 771 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
17 Id. at 753.
18 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing the
injunction).
19 See Marj Charlier, For Manville, a Sale or Breakup Appears Imminent, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 1992, at B4.
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agers turned to Congress and persuaded it to adopt an amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), that “codif[ied]” the per-
sonal injury trust structure.20
The new statutory authority for the Manville reorganization—
along with the bankruptcy court’s decision to assuage the due process
concerns that sunk Amchem by appointing a future claims representa-
tive—removed the most significant legal obstacles to the Manville
reorganization. Where the Amchem settlement failed, Manville suc-
ceeded. Insulated from asbestos claims by the channeling injunction,
Manville returned to profitability and was sold to Berkshire Hathaway
in 2000 for $1.96 billion.21 But this success was not without costs.
Claims against Manville were evaluated and paid by a special-purpose
entity which followed procedures that looked nothing like those used
in ordinary courts. The claims were paid at a fraction of their value in
the tort system.22 And Manville’s successful restructuring placed enor-
mous pressure on other asbestos manufacturers to restructure via
§ 524(g) to avoid being held liable for injuries caused by Manville
products on joint and several liability theories.23
The midstream reconfiguration of the procedures used to resolve
Manville’s asbestos liabilities illustrates a broader phenomenon that
this Article terms “ad hoc procedure.”24 Ad hoc procedure is designed
20 Special Problems in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 61–62 (1991) (statement of
W.T. Stephens, Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Manville
Corp.) (asking the subcommittee to “codify the permanent nature of court-ordered and
-issued injunctions in the context of a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding”).
21 Devon Spurgeon, Berkshire Hathaway to Acquire Johns Manville for $1.96 Billion,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB977318255230066002.
22 In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 479, 568 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting the trust’s insufficient funds to pay all claims and certifying a
settlement class providing pro rata distribution of funds to claims at a fraction of their
value), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996).
23 Injunctions in Mass Tort Cases in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Econ. and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 63 (1992)
[hereinafter House Manville Hearings] (testimony of Roger E. Podesta, Partner, Debevoise
& Plimpton).
24 By “procedure,” we refer broadly to the field of law, ordinarily termed “civil
procedure,” that enables private parties to enlist the state’s help to assert claims against
other parties. This understanding of procedure sweeps more broadly than the idea of
procedure that is at issue in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. The concern under Erie and the Enabling Act is to identify
the set of policy decisions about the processing of civil claims that federal courts may
legitimately make when exercising jurisdiction over claims that arise under state law and
are heard in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. Our concern, by contrast, is
with the broader set of laws and governmental institutions that govern private civil
litigation. We are concerned with the institutions of “adversarial legalism” or the modern
“litigation state” as opposed to the limited universe of rules that the Supreme Court may
promulgate in the exercise of its delegated rulemaking authority. See generally SEAN
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to address a procedural problem that arises in a pending case or litiga-
tion. It is then applied retroactively to that pending case or litigation
in order to achieve a desired result.
This kind of procedure-making strays from the traditional model.
Civil procedure traditionally has been established in advance of dis-
putes by policymakers seeking to establish fair “rules of the road”25
for the way that disputes are resolved,26 a style of procedure-making
that underpins the legitimacy of state action in civil litigation. As
expressed by Friedrich Hayek, the rule of law “means that govern-
ment in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced before-
hand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how
the [state] will use its coercive powers in given circumstances.”27
Courts resolve claims through procedures established in advance of
concrete disputes by policymakers who cannot anticipate the effects of
their choices on specific litigants. This process for establishing proce-
dures serves as a check against the arbitrary exercise of state power
and helps to ensure that all parties—the state included—receive equal
justice under law.28 The traditional style of procedure-making also
contributes to the legitimacy of state action in litigation by following
the basic requirements of traditional separation-of-powers theory,
separating the tasks of procedural design (legislation or rulemaking)
from the resolution of specific controversies (adjudication).29
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
U.S. 10–18 (2010) (examining the legal infrastructure for private enforcement of federal
statutory rights); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 3–18 (2001) (examining American adversarial methods of policy implementation). We
take no position on the proper understanding of “procedure” for purposes of Erie and the
Enabling Act. Nor do we take sides in the long-running debate over whether it is possible
to isolate substance from procedure, other than positing the usefulness of “procedure” as
shorthand for the large body of laws and government institutions that govern the
processing of civil claims asserted by private litigants.
25 For the “rule[s] of the road” analogy, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 74 (1944).
26 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 890, 926–30 (1999)
(highlighting advantages of procedural rules promulgated ex ante by a centralized
procedure-making body); Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L.
REV. 388, 388 (1910) (asserting that procedure serves “to eliminate . . . the personal
equation in judicial action”).
27 HAYEK, supra note 25, at 72.
28 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 342
(2008). While the ideals of the rule of law are hotly contested, it is typically agreed that the
rule of law contains some or all of these basic tenets. Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns
Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 316–17
(2011).
29 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.” (quoting 1 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
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Civil procedure, however, can also be established while litigation
is pending, in response to problems that arise in specific disputes,
resulting in ad hoc procedure. We refer to the timing of such proce-
dural changes as occurring “midstream”—the litigation has
progressed to a point where parties are able to tell whether the ordi-
nary processes of law are likely to give the parties closure and other
outcomes they expect from litigation. When procedure is created at
this stage to right the course, it can take the form of a court’s order, a
privately-negotiated agreement, a new entity established to pay
claims, or new legislation. Ad hoc procedure overcomes problems that
cannot be solved using the existing procedural structures, and may be
necessary to ensure that the civil justice system is able to provide the
ordinary desiderata of civil litigation in cases that defy customary judi-
cial management. Yet by dictating how claims will be resolved at the
very moment they are asserted, ad hoc procedure seems to violate
basic tenets of the rule of law. Designed to address specific problems,
ad hoc procedure cannot rely on the fact that it is crafted behind a veil
of ignorance in advance of concrete disputes as proof of its fairness.
The Article has two goals. First, it aims to introduce the general
phenomenon of ad hoc procedure. Second, it considers whether the
specific type of statutory ad hoc procedure illustrated by § 524(g) and
similar statutes can be reconciled with the rule-of-law commitments
that have long informed the way that civil procedure is designed in
western, liberal democracies—in both the United States and Europe.
Part I provides an overview of ad hoc procedure and the chal-
lenges that it presents to the traditional image of procedural design
that underpins much U.S. and European procedure. Proceduralists
have long posited that the state should resolve legal disputes using
processes that are established in advance of concrete cases by neutral
policymakers who aspire to treat litigants fairly and evenhandedly.
But such procedures cannot anticipate all potential procedural
problems that can arise in specific cases. Ad hoc procedures respond
to these problems. They may be formalized in court orders, adminis-
trative adjudication schemes, special-purpose claims facilities, or stat-
utes, such as § 524(g). These forms of procedural ad hocery differ in
their specificity, their power to bind third parties, and the ease with
which they are established. Yet each addresses a problem that arises in
a specific case through a midstream intervention that changes the way
that claims are processed.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (Edinburgh, A. Kincaid & W. Creech 1773)
(1748))).
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Focusing specifically on ad hoc procedural statutes such as
§ 524(g), Part I then considers the challenges that this form of ad hoc
procedure-making presents to the traditional view that procedure
should be established in advance of disputes by policymakers who are
not motivated to favor particular parties or political objectives and
who aspire to treat like cases alike. On the surface, ad hoc procedural
legislation seems to combine the most objectionable aspects of proce-
dure that is created for nakedly partisan purposes and procedure that
singles out a group for special treatment. It applies retroactively to
pending litigation, where the winners and losers of the procedural
change are well known, and draws lines that appear to treat similar
cases differently. Moreover, ad hoc procedural legislation is enacted
without the level of vetting that generally applicable procedures usu-
ally receive.30
Moving beyond the normative challenges presented by ad hoc
procedural legislation, Part II traces the development of four stat-
utes—two from the United States and two from Europe—that
responded to particular problems in complex litigation. The case
studies reveal the extent to which ad hoc procedural legislation chal-
lenges the traditional image of civil procedure. But they also show
that ad hoc legislation addresses important problems that cannot be
solved using the ordinary processes of law. Although such legislation
conflicts with deeply held intuitions about what procedure is and
should be, it is to some extent inescapable and necessary to ensure the
functioning of the civil justice system in these cases. We call this the
“double aspect” of ad hoc procedural legislation.
Building on this intuition, Part III returns to the normative chal-
lenge of ad hoc procedural legislation and reevaluates that challenge
in light of Part II’s case studies. Going beyond ad hoc legislation’s
surface tension with the rule-of-law values that have traditionally
informed procedural design, we show that ad hoc procedure-making
involves two tradeoffs that bear on any evaluation of particular ad hoc
procedural statutes. First, ad hoc procedure’s retroactivity—changing
procedural rules of the road just in time to process claims in pending
litigations—is inextricably tied up with its capacity to overcome proce-
30 Writing two decades ago, one commentator estimated that the average time to
promulgate a new federal court rule is “two to three years.” See Peter G. McCabe,
Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1995). This
analysis may underestimate the length of the modern rulemaking process. The associate
reporter to the current advisory committee on the Federal Rules tells us that significant
rule reforms, such as the 2016 amendment to Rule 23, now take much longer than two to
three years. E-mail from Richard Marcus, Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal.
Hastings Coll. of the Law, to authors (Apr. 30, 2017, 9:51 PM) (on file with the New York
University Law Review).
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dural problems that are not anticipated by ordinary processes of law.
Second, the specificity of much ad hoc procedural legislation reflects
the distinctive dynamics of ad hoc procedure-making, which generate
a large amount of information about the procedure-generating case
but relatively little information about an ad hoc intervention’s effects
on third parties.
Recognizing these dynamics highlights unavoidable costs of ad
hoc procedural legislation, but those costs do not show that such legis-
lation should be categorically avoided. Ad hoc procedural legislation
may be necessary, and can help the civil justice system do justice in
cases that cannot be resolved using ordinary processes of law. None-
theless, the circumstances in which it is created bear on its legitimacy.
Ad hoc legislation in one sense is the most legitimate form of ad hoc
procedure, because it is law under the relevant constitutional norms.
But its formal legal status does not answer the rule-of-law objections
that follow from the timeframe in which it is enacted and lawmakers’
awareness of how their interventions will affect particular litigants.
Instead of following from the fact that procedure is designed in
advance of concrete disputes by actors who are not motivated by a
desire to help particular actors, ad hoc procedural legislation’s legiti-
macy follows, if at all, from its necessity and from the substantive fair-
ness of the outcomes that it enables. Ad hoc procedural legislation is
legitimate when it enables the legal system to provide ordinary goods
from litigation and allocates them fairly. It is illegitimate when either
condition fails to hold. Ad hoc procedural legislation thus depends
upon a different conception of legitimacy than traditional civil proce-
dure—one less concerned with lawmaking processes than the legisla-
ture’s reasons for acting and the equity of its action.31 We close by
31 Richard Fallon distinguishes among legal legitimacy (whether a directive is lawful),
sociological legitimacy (whether “the relevant public regards [the directive] as justified,
appropriate, or otherwise deserving support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere
hope for personal reward”), and moral legitimacy (whether the directive is morally
justified). Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1795 (2005). In this framework, ad hoc procedural legislation enjoys at best a thin form of
legal legitimacy that reflects its status as formal, enacted law. An ad hoc procedural statute
may—but need not—be strongly legitimate in the sociological and moral senses, depending
on the legislature’s reasons for acting and the distributive implications of its legislative
design choices. For other efforts to organize intuitions surrounding the concept of
legitimacy, see, for example, Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82
AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712, 725 (1988) (identifying pedigree, determinacy, symbolic
validation, coherence, and adherence as sources of legitimacy in international law), and
Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379,
412–15 (distinguishing among formal and “substantive order” legitimation and suggesting
that the sociology of law abandon the legitimation concept entirely). The locus classicus
remains MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of
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explaining this point’s implications for legislatures and courts consid-
ering ad hoc procedural legislation.
I
THE LANDSCAPE OF AD HOC PROCEDURE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF AD HOC PROCEDURAL
LEGISLATION
The development of the Manville personal injury trust and ratifi-
cation of the trust’s structure in § 524(g) is not the only time that a
form of dispute resolution procedure has been created on the fly in
response to problems that emerged in a specific litigation. To illustrate
the scale and diversity of ad hoc procedure-making, this Part zooms
out and describes how ad hoc procedure relates to traditional images
of procedure and non-traditional procedural interventions. We then
sketch a typology of ad hoc procedure and, focusing specifically on the
type of legislation illustrated by § 524(g), consider the challenge that it
presents to deeply held intuitions about procedural design.
A. Civil Procedure and the Rule of Law
The idea of “ad hoc procedure” seems almost to be an oxymoron.
When U.S. law students first encounter the field of civil procedure,
they typically32 study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “great
trans-substantive code”33 forged under the authority of the Rules
Enabling Act (Enabling Act).34 The Federal Rules are established in
advance of specific cases by a group of experts, who work to create
procedures that will “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action and proceeding” across the landscape of civil
disputes.35 The same set of rules govern “the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”36 Rule
amendments apply prospectively by default and take effect only after
Cal. Press 1978) (1922), which distinguishes among legitimacy derived from habit of use
(traditional authority), legitimacy derived from the personal qualities of a leader
(charismatic authority), and “rational” legitimacy (legal authority). See id. at 212–16.
32 But see David L. Noll, A Reader’s Guide to Pre-modern Procedure, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 414, 414 n.1 (2015) (noting exceptions to the federal focus of U.S. procedure
education).
33 Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2072. For a history of the Rules’ drafting, see Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943–75 (1987).
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
36 Id.
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they have sat before Congress for a minimum of seven months.37
Indeed, a major argument for the Enabling Act’s delegation to judicial
experts of the power to make procedure was to change the preexisting
status quo, where Congress frequently amended procedural rules.38
The Rules are decidedly not ad hoc.
The Federal Rules and the process through which they are cre-
ated reflect the influence of a process-based model of the rule of law
that equates the “rule of law” with the state acting through laws that
are designed in a manner aimed to ensure that lawmakers act in the
public interest.39 Perhaps the most famous statement of this model
appears in Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom.40 Hayek observed there
that when the state acts through formal, ex ante rules, lawmakers
operate behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from using the
power to make law to redistribute resources to favored groups.
Unable to anticipate how their enactments will affect particular par-
ties and interest groups, lawmakers can do no more than create gen-
eral laws that provide ground rules for private ordering.41 In contrast,
when lawmakers address specific problems through “ad hoc action,”
the state acts as a “moral agent,” that picks “winners and losers.”42
Hayek claimed that it is only when lawmakers act in the former
mode—when they are ignorant of their handiwork’s distributional
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (directing the Supreme Court to send “to the Congress not
later than May 1” proposed amendments to the Rules, to take effect “no earlier than
December 1”). With respect to the temporal scope of amendments, § 2074(a) provides:
“The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending,
except . . . to the extent that . . . the application of such rule in such proceedings would not
be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies.” Id.
38 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 (4th ed. 2015).
39 The process-based account is of course only one of the ways that the “rule of law”
ideal is used in contemporary discourse. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 140–45 (2002) (surveying
the multiple conflicting uses of “rule of law” in contemporary jurisprudence).
40 HAYEK, supra note 25. The “cri du coeur of a nineteenth-century Viennese liberal
against the worldwide drift toward dictatorship and totalitarianism,” MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 228 (1992), The Road to Serfdom broadly argued against economic planning
and government activity “deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of
different people,” on the ground that “[t]o produce the same result for different people, it
is necessary to treat them differently.” HAYEK, supra note 25, at 79.
41 See HAYEK, supra note 25, at 75 (explaining that formal ex ante rules “are expected
to be useful to yet unknown people, for purposes for which these people will decide to use
for them, and in circumstances which cannot be foreseen in detail”).
42 See id. at 76–77 (“Where the precise effects of government policy on particular
people are known, where the government aims directly at such particular effects, it cannot
help knowing these effects, and therefore it cannot be impartial. It must, of necessity, take
sides, impose its valuations upon people and, instead of assisting them in the advancement
of their own ends, choose the ends for them.”).
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consequences—that a law complies with the rule of law. He therefore
distinguished enactments that have the formal status of law under the
relevant constitutional norms from enactments that complied with the
rule of law. Although an enactment might formally qualify as law
because it was established through constitutional procedures, it only
complied with the rule of law if lawmakers were insulated from the
law’s effects.43
Hayek did not distinguish between substantive and procedural
legislation, and the benefits that he associated with broadly applicable
ex ante rules do not depend on whether a law is classified as substan-
tive or procedural. Even so, there are special reasons for governments
to follow the Hayekian model when establishing rules of dispute reso-
lution procedure.
An important body of work in social psychology establishes that
“authorities and institutions are viewed as more legitimate and, there-
fore, their decisions and rules are more willingly accepted when they
exercise their authority through procedures that people experience as
being fair.”44 This procedural effect has been documented in a range
of countries and institutional settings.45 For example, a simulation
43 See id. at 82–83 (“If the law says that such a board or authority may do what it
pleases, anything that board or authority does is legal—but its actions are certainly not
subject to the Rule of Law. By giving the government unlimited powers, the most arbitrary
rule can be made legal . . . .”).
44 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376, 379 (2006) (reviewing and summarizing the psychological
literature on legitimacy, “a property that, when it is possessed, leads people to defer
voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social arrangements”).
45 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J.
PSYCHOL. 117 (2000) (surveying recent research). For specific study results, see, for
example, TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 7 (2002) (finding, based on surveys of
citizens who interacted with the police or the legal system, that the degree to which people
feel they have been treated fairly helps to shape their acceptance of the legal process),
Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice
on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 194 (1997) (finding that use of fair
procedures on the part of police officers called to the scene of a domestic assault is
associated with a reduction in future assaults), and Donna Shestowsky, Procedural
Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211, 242–45 (2004) (finding that disputants prefer mediation
processes in which a neutral third party helped them reach a resolution and disputants
were entitled to introduce information on their own behalf without the help of a
representative). The seminal study is JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975), which first established that disputants—in
that study, undergraduates who participated in a business simulation experiment—are
more likely to accept the outcome of a decision process if they perceive that it is reached
through fair procedures. See id. at 118; see also TYLER & HUO, supra, at 81–96 (discussing
findings supporting a process-based strategy for fostering acceptance of an authority’s
decisions).
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experiment conducted in seven countries revealed that employees
who were fired from their job or denied a position when applying for a
new job were more likely to accept the decision when they were given
an opportunity to explain their point of view and perceived the deci-
sion maker to be impartial.46 In contrast, unfair decision procedures
such as racial profiling have been shown to diminish confidence in
legal institutions.47
The Enabling Act model of procedural design—which seeks to
ensure that lawmakers design procedural rules in a way that advances
the public’s interest in fair and efficient dispute resolution—provides
an important guaranty of the procedural fairness that is central to
public perceptions of the legitimacy of legal judgments.48 Given the
connection between fair procedure on the one hand and people’s
acceptance of legal judgments on the other, it is unsurprising that
many procedural systems share the Enabling Act’s high-level commit-
ment to ex ante rules that are established in advance of particular con-
troversies. A Dutch statute enacted in 2000, for example, provided for
uniform court rules that, in a parallel to the Enabling Act, would be
46 Ellen S. Cohn et al., Distributive and Procedural Justice in Seven Nations, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 553, 553 (2000). The magnitude of the “voice” and “impartiality” effects
depended on the simulation that subjects participated in, however. See id. at 554–55, 559
(discussing the differences between scenarios with more procedural fairness and less
distributional justice, and vice versa).
47 Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural
Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253,
276 (2004).
48 During debates over the Enabling Act, the bill’s backers contended that the
technicality and complexity of common law procedure corroded public confidence in the
law. For instance, an American Bar Association report urging enactment of the Enabling
Act compared court procedure to a municipality’s infrastructure and argued that good
legal infrastructure was needed for the law to accomplish its objectives. See Thomas W.
Shelton, Putting Courts on Business Basis, AM. INDUS., Apr. 1923, at 27, 29 (“A city might
construct the most modern and capacious reservoir . . . but the quality and quantity that
reaches the consumer will be measured by the pipes through which it is conveyed. So . . .
the potency and merit of the law will be measured by the machinery through which it is
administered . . . .”). The Supreme Court echoed the good-infrastructure theme in a
seminal early decision interpreting the Enabling Act. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 14 (1941). “[T]he new policy envisaged in the enabling act,” the Court wrote, “was
that the whole field of court procedure be regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and exact
determination of the truth.” Id. The theme continues to be invoked by supporters of court-
developed procedure. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, U.S. Circuit Judge,
Sixth Circuit, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure & Hon. David G. Campbell,
U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of Ariz., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Bob
Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Apr. 13,
2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Judicial-Conference-Letter.pdf
(“Congress designed the Rules Enabling Act process . . . to produce the best rules possible
through broad public participation and review by the bench, the bar, and the academy. The
Enabling Act charges the judiciary with the task of neutral, independent, and thorough
analysis of the rules and their operation.”).
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 12 Side A      10/12/2017   08:00:42
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 12 Side A      10/12/2017   08:00:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU401.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-OCT-17 14:40
October 2017] AD HOC PROCEDURE 781
“created by a committee of judges and laid down in so-called proces-
reglementen (procedural regulations).”49 A 2001 German statute
granted trial judges new case-management authority and imposed
tighter deadlines on the pre-trial process in an effort “to foster trans-
parency and acceptance of court decisions.”50
Enactments such as these reflect a belief that how procedure is
made affects whether courts’ work product is accepted as fair and
legitimate. Across legal systems, the law of civil procedure expressly
or implicitly promises litigants a fair system for resolving controver-
sies. That procedural rules are cast at a broad level of generality and
defined in advance of disputes by lawmakers who are unaware of how
their enactments will affect particular groups provides a powerful
guaranty of procedural fairness. Procedural fairness, in turn, contrib-
utes to the courts’ work product being perceived as legitimate. Judg-
ments are legitimate in large measure because they are the product of
fair procedures that are defined in advance of disputes.
B. Politically Motivated Procedure, Substance-Specific Procedure,
and Ad Hoc Procedure
The model of procedure-making that we have just sketched seeks
to ensure the fairness of dispute resolution procedure by establishing
procedural rules in advance of concrete controversies. In this Article,
we will treat this model as the traditional model of procedural
design.51
Notwithstanding the traditional model’s intuitive appeal, scholars
have recognized that not all procedure is made in the manner that the
model envisions. Departures occur along three dimensions: The
field of civil procedure is neither as politically neutral, nor as trans-
substantive, nor as forward-looking as the traditional model suggests.
From the perspective of the traditional model, each of these depar-
tures diminishes procedure’s presumptive legitimacy.
49 C.H. (Remco) van Rhee & Remme Verkerk, The Netherlands: A No-Nonsense
Approach to Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE:
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND THE PARTIES 259, 264 (C.H. (Remco) van Rhee
& Fu Yulin eds., 2014) [hereinafter LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE].
50 Andrea Wall, Austria & Germany: A History of Successful Reforms, in LITIGATION
IN CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 49, at 141, 161.
51 Historians debate when the traditional model took hold. In the United States, the
1851 Field Code is generally considered the first modern code of civil procedure. See
Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of
Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 155–60 (2015). But see
Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988) (same); Subrin, supra note 34
(describing the 1938 Federal Rules as the beginning of modern procedure).
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First, scholars have shown that procedure is rarely as free from
political motivations as the traditional model would have one believe.
“Politically motivated procedure-making” has goals—like regulatory
deterrence, wealth transfer, and changes in social mores—that are
extrinsic to the civil justice system as opposed to seeking to ensure
that claims are resolved fairly and efficiently.52 When policymakers
who lack authority to make substantive regulatory policy (like mem-
bers of the Rules Committee) engage in such procedure-making, their
procedural interventions are presumptively illegitimate: We suspect
that a decision framed in nominally procedural terms is, in fact, driven
by a substantive regulatory agenda.53 Even when democratic legisla-
tures with unquestionable authority to make substantive regulatory
policy enact politically motivated procedures, as in the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,54 their efforts challenge techno-
cratic policymakers’ monopoly over procedural design, and with it, the
assumption that procedural design is necessarily apolitical.55
Second, procedure is not as “trans-substantive” as the traditional
model suggests.56 A notable example in U.S. civil procedure is the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),57 which
responded to the securities litigation defense bar’s complaints that
52 In suggesting that this is a “political” use of procedure-making, we follow Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1677, 1688–89 (2004). See also STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 2 (2017)
(noting debates over “aspects of the agenda to diminish or disable the infrastructure for
the private enforcement of federal rights”).
53 In response to such concerns, 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act
mandated open meetings and extended the period during which a proposed rule must lie
before Congress. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4648–50 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74); BURBANK
& FARHANG, supra note 52, at 108–12. For criticisms of procedural changes that trade on
the changes’ political appearance, see, for example, Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil
Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 600 (2010) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s changes to procedural rules “manifest[ ] political objectives”),
and Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 852 (2010) (suggesting that the Supreme Court was addressing a
perceived “litigation-crisis” in developing the “plausibility” pleading standard).
54 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
55 See generally FARHANG, supra note 24, at 94–128 (discussing the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and political compromises regarding its private enforcement scheme).
56 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,”
2009 WIS. L. REV. 535 (discussing arguments that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), should be confined to antitrust cases); Cover, supra note 33 (exploring tensions
between the Rules and particular substantive procedural needs); David Marcus, The Past,
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371 (2010) (discussing the history of and departures from trans-substantivity).
57 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely filed frivolous lawsuits whenever a securi-
ties issuer’s stock price changed, on the hope that surviving a motion
to dismiss would lead to a sizable settlement to avoid discovery and
further litigation.58 To assuage this perceived litigation abuse,59 the
PSLRA heightened pleading requirements and changed other proce-
dures under the Federal Rules exclusively for claims under the federal
securities laws.60 The statute explicitly departs from the norm that
civil claims are resolved through cross-cutting rules that apply to “all
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”61
Third, scholars have noted that not all procedure is established in
advance of proceedings, in part because not all procedural problems
that arise in the course of litigation can be anticipated. Writing on the
Enabling Act’s fortieth anniversary, Professor Robert Cover observed
that the rule makers’ achievement was “all the more remarkable when
one realizes that the river of litigation constantly erodes the architec-
ture of process-oriented codes, leaving us with its case law incidents of
application.”62 Fifteen years after Cover’s essay, Professor Linda
Silberman detailed the ways in which magistrate judges and special
masters “customize procedure for particular and individual cases.”63
58 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730.
59 The PSLRA appears to have developed in response to a perceived problem
throughout a category of cases—securities litigation—rather than in response to a
particular procedural problem that developed in a particular case, making it unlike the ad
hoc procedural statutes discussed infra in Part II.
60 For example, under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must identify in her complaint “each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1); see also id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring allegations
of scienter); id. § 78u-4(b)(4) (allocating to the plaintiff the burden of proof on loss
causation); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery pending the resolution of a motion to
dismiss).
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The conflicts between the procedures in the PSLRA and the trans-
substantive federal rules have generated substantial criticism. See, e.g., William D.
Browning, Comment on “The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement,” 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 709, 709–10 (1996) (criticizing the PSLRA’s new pleading requirement for its
potential to produce extensive litigation); Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter
Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 459–60 (1998) (summarizing criticisms).
62 Cover, supra note 33, at 732.
63 Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131 (1989). Professor Silberman’s thoughtful article
contends that “trans-substantive rulemaking in fact has been eroded and replaced by ad
hoc versions of specialized rules” through a close case study of customized procedures put
in place by special masters and magistrate judges. Id. Here, we define and explore a
broader phenomenon, expanding the understanding of “ad hoc procedure” to encompass
the work not just of special masters and magistrates, but also judges of all levels, parties,
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As the next section will show, ad hoc procedure is a distinct phe-
nomenon. But it can exhibit all of the above features. Ad hoc proce-
dure can be politically motivated, it is often (but not always)
substance specific, and it is inherently backward-looking. Because of
this overlap, ad hoc procedure invites the normative objections voiced
against those varieties of procedure. Nevertheless, it is its own animal.
Our aim in this Article is to define the phenomenon of ad hoc
procedure-making, begin to integrate it into the civil procedure litera-
ture, and investigate both the intersections among substance-specific
procedure, politically motivated procedure, and ad hoc procedure,
and the legitimacy of procedural interventions that are designed to
bring about specific litigation outcomes.64 We focus on ad hoc proce-
dural statutes that address procedural problems created by the inade-
quacies of provisions such as Rule 23, but we also investigate the
phenomenon on a broader scale.
C. A Typology of Ad Hoc Procedure
As this Article defines it, “ad hoc procedure” is (1) motivated by
a problem (or problems) that is specific to a case or set of cases and
(2) addresses that problem in the midst of a faltering pending litiga-
tion, through an intervention that changes the “rules of the road” for
the case or litigation as it proceeds. The problems that ad hoc proce-
dure addresses characteristically involve a failure to deliver a good
that the civil justice system provides in ordinary cases, such as a means
of processing claims or offering peace when litigation concludes.65 It is
the desire to address such a problem as opposed to a desire to address
systemic concerns that distinguishes ad hoc procedural design. Ad hoc
legislatures, and other actors who establish procedures motivated by a particular problem
in a pending case that apply to that pending case and potentially beyond.
64 In doing so, we seek to contribute to debates about trans-substantivity and the
possibility of neutrality in a world with increasingly politicized attitudes toward procedure.
See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067, 2069 (1989) (arguing that the rulemaking process is “ill-suited to resolving
political contests between competing groups who seek at the expense of their adversaries
to advance their short-term interests in litigation outcomes”). See generally Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 761, 776–79 (1993) [hereinafter Marcus, Babies and Bathwater].
65 We do not attempt to catalog all of the goods provided by the judicial system here.
Cf., e.g., Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
916 (1979) (listing the eight goals of dispute resolution systems to be finality, obedience,
guidance, efficiency, availability, neutrality, conflict reduction, and fairness); Judith Resnik,
Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 609–12 (1985) (listing the features of a
procedural system as litigant persuasion opportunities, litigant autonomy, mechanism for
allocating decision makers’ power, impartiality, visibility, rational decision-making, finality,
revisionism, economy, consistency, differentiation, and ritual).
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procedure may or may not be cast in cross-cutting trans-substantive
terms, but it is decidedly procedure of the particular.
Once one begins to look for ad hoc procedure, examples of it
appear everywhere. These examples can helpfully be organized
according to the formal type of legal enactment in which a procedure
appears.66 Doing so yields the following typology of ad hoc procedure:
1. Case-Specific Procedure: Ad Hoc Applications, Court Orders,
and Party Agreements
The drafters of the Federal Rules intended to bestow consider-
able discretion upon judges to adjust to procedural issues as they
come up in litigation.67 Some ad hoc procedure is simply created
within the confines of these flexible rules when parties and judges con-
front a procedural impasse in the course of a case.68 But ad hoc proce-
dure created in such a context can also try or exceed those bounds.69
For example, the judge may use her general authority to manage liti-
gation and regulate the bar to craft an ad hoc procedural fix, such as a
protocol governing the use of predictive coding software in e-
discovery70 or limitations on attorneys’ fees in multidistrict litigation.71
Alternatively, parties may devise a procedural fix on their own,
with or without a court’s formal sanction.72 In the Enron and Lehman
66 Thanks to Sergio Campos for suggesting this organization.
67 See Subrin, supra note 34, at 923–25 (arguing that the Rules “enlarged judicial
discretion,” reflecting the “equity mentality” of the new procedural system); cf. Lawrence
B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 120–21
(Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (arguing that case-specific equity and the rule of law are
reconcilable).
68 See generally Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981).
69 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2013) (arguing that Judge Alvin Hellerstein’s ad hoc procedural
innovations in the 9/11 first responders litigation were within his authority due to “the
distinctive liability policies” behind the statutory scheme that defined and limited that
litigation, and that the scope of a judge’s authority to engage in procedural ad hocery
depends on the substantive legal policies at issues in the litigation).
70 See, e.g., Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279, 2012 WL 1446534,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012).
71 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (Kaplan,
J., concurring) (addressing the authority of district court judges to alter fee awards in MDL
litigation); see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107,
149–52 (2010) (questioning the lawfulness and merits of judicial control over attorney
appointments and fee awards in MDLs).
72 See generally Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389 (2014); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in
Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015).
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bankruptcies, for example, the parties devised a novel dispute resolu-
tion system to liquidate the debtor’s claims against third parties.73
Through an order on notice, the bankruptcy court subjected all third
parties to the procedure that the lawyers leading the bankruptcy
devised.74 Such measures, too, can spark controversy over the extent
of the parties’ authority and the legitimacy of procedures that result
from party maneuvering.75
In spite of criticism, party agreements and the exercise of case-by-
case discretion are contemplated throughout much of American civil
procedure.76 Moreover, case-specific applications may lead to estab-
lished forms of procedure when a case-specific application is invoked
in future cases or disseminated as a best practice by law firms, bar
organizations, and standard-setting bodies.77 Judicial control of
contingent-fee arrangements, for example, was quickly adopted by
73 See Order Pursuant to Sections 105 & 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to Establish
Procedures for the Settlement or Assumption & Assignment of Prepetition Derivative
Contracts, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 469 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No.
08-13555) [hereinafter Lehman Order]; Order Amending Procedures for Settlement of
Terminated Safe Harbor Agreements, In re Enron Corp., 298 B.R. 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter Enron Order].
74 Lehman Order, supra note 73, at 3–8; Enron Order, supra note 73, at 2–5.
75 A particularly sharp point of contention among bankruptcy scholars is the legitimacy
of the pre-packaged asset sales through which the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies were
effected. Compare, e.g. , Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy
Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375
(criticizing the sales), with Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in
Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009) (defending the sales).
76 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (granting courts management discretion to issue pretrial
conferences and scheduling orders); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3401 (McKinney 2017) (granting the
chief court administrator discretion to adopt rules regulating hearings); see also Jay
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 528 n.72 (2006) (“By
Professor Subrin’s count, judicial discretion is explicitly or implicitly provided for in
twenty-eight of the eighty-four Federal Rules; the list includes many of the most significant
of these rules.” (citing Subrin, supra note 34, at 923 n.76)). Internationally, few countries
follow the American model of permitting such extensive judicial innovation. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1569
(2003) (describing English judges as “much more constrained than American judges”). But
see, e.g., Ianika N. Tzankova, Case Management: The Stepchild of Mass Claim Dispute
Resolution, 19 UNIFORM L. REV. 329, 339 n.42, 342–43 (2014) (discussing a Dutch example
of involved judicial case management).
77 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 988 (1995) (noting the trial-and-error development of mass tort
litigation); Silberman, supra note 63, at 2175–77 (arguing that judicial innovations in
complex litigation have eroded the trans-substantive character of federal civil procedure);
William H. Rehnquist et al., Tribute: In Honor of Judge William W Schwarzer, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1059–168 (1995) (collecting comments that reflect upon Judge
Schwarzer’s case-specific procedural innovations); Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity:
Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2225, 2234–36 (2000) (discussing the role of the Manual for Complex Litigation in doctrinal
innovations).
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courts outside the Eastern District of New York after Judge Weinstein
pioneered it in the Zyprexa multidistrict litigation, and today it is a
standard feature of multidistrict litigation.78
2. Ad Hoc Administrative Adjudication Schemes
Just as the problems presented by a particular case or type of
litigation may prompt a court to develop a new form of procedure,
they may motivate lawmakers to redirect claims to a new tribunal that
is designed to work better than courts. For example, in response to a
“downpour of litigation” triggered by highly publicized vaccine acci-
dents,79 the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act established a spe-
cialized tribunal within the U.S. Court of Federal Claims that pays
claims for vaccine-related injuries via a no-fault liability scheme cre-
ated in the Act.80 The tribunal aims to provide compensation to indi-
viduals who are injured by covered vaccines via “less-adversarial,
expeditious, and informal proceeding[s].”81 To this end, the Vaccine
Act “discards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits neither
pretrial discovery nor cross-examination as of right, relaxes rules for
the admission of evidence, and eliminates the need to provide live tes-
timony (instead permitting the parties to introduce evidence by affi-
davit, sworn declaration, or via telephone or videotape).”82 The U.S.
Court of Federal Claims is not an Article III court, but the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence allows specialized tribunals to be located in
non-Article III agencies so long as doing so does not compromise “the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”83
78 See sources cited supra note 71 (describing doctrines courts developed to regulate
attorneys’ fees in multidistrict litigation).
79 ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST
LIFESAVER 266 (2007).
80 Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 2110–23, 100 Stat. 3755, 3758–74 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-10 to -23) (establishing procedures for the administration of the scheme).
81 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A).
82 Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1663 (2015).
83 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). Under
Schor, an agency adjudication scheme’s effect on the institutional integrity of the Article
III courts depends upon the jurisdiction and powers the agency court exercises, “the
origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.” Id. But see Stern v. Marshall, 131
S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (stating that “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789” must be tried by an Article III court when it
falls within federal jurisdiction (quoting Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment))).
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3. Ad Hoc Entities
In the face of potential or pending litigation, “claims facilities”
with their own unique (or borrowed) procedures are sometimes estab-
lished to provide a forum for victims of a mass harm to liquidate
claims. Because such facilities are not formal state institutions, they
often are presented as a form of “alternate dispute resolution” that
litigants may choose to invoke as an alternative to asserting claims in
public court. The economic barriers to public court litigation, how-
ever, can make that “choice” illusory.84 Domestic examples of such
entities include the black lung compensation program,85 the
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund,86 and the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility.87 Foreign governments have established claims facili-
ties to provide compensation to victims of mass harms, and facilities
have also been established by international agreements, for example,
to provide reparations to victims of the Holocaust.88
4. Ad Hoc Procedural Legislation
Each of these forms of ad hoc procedure raises distinct institu-
tional and normative questions that we intend to address in future
work. In this Article, we focus on a fourth category of ad hoc proce-
dure—that established in legislation such as § 524(g). This category
encompasses new forms of procedure, established by statute, that
govern proceedings in ordinary courts that preexisted the procedure-
generating problem. Statutory ad hoc procedure is created through
“ad hoc procedural statutes” or “ad hoc procedural legislation.”89
84 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 648
(2008) (describing the strong incentives and encouragement 9/11 victims received to
participate in the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund and to forego bringing claims
in court).
85 See Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–45 (providing monthly compensation
and medical benefits to coal miners totally disabled from black lung disease).
86 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§§ 401–09, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (creating an administrative system to compensate
September 11th victims in exchange for their agreement to forego litigation).
87 See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY: PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE
PAYMENTS (2010), https://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library/
assets/gccf-emergency-advance-payments.pdf (outlining a privately-funded plan that
allowed individuals and businesses damaged by the Deepwater Horizon accident to receive
financial compensation).
88 See Adam S. Zimmerman, The Global Convergence of Global Settlements, 65 KAN.
L. REV. 1053, 1077–78 (2017) (describing the agreement by American diplomats, European
regulators, and insurance companies that created the International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims).
89 Ad hoc procedural statutes are just one subset of legislative interventions in
procedure. The PSLRA and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
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Like other forms of ad hoc procedure, ad hoc procedural legisla-
tion varies in the extent to which it is motivated by a specific case.90
Likewise, the procedures established may be limited to a single case,91
or, at the other end of the spectrum, establish a generally applicable,
trans-substantive rule.92 Regardless of where a statute falls along
these dimensions, it changes the rules for resolving disputes mid-
stream in response to problems revealed by specific litigation.
Two statutes that are well known to scholars offer initial exam-
ples that help to frame our discussion. The first is the Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL) statute,93 which established a mechanism for con-
solidating related cases before a single judge for consolidated pretrial
management and now accounts for thirty-six percent of open cases on
the federal docket.94 The MDL statute was developed in the 1960s “to
address a deluge of antitrust litigation spawned by revelations of
price-fixing in the electrical-equipment industry.”95 The statute’s
drafters used the judicial response to the electrical equipment industry
litigation, described by one judge as “the greatest challenge to the
administration of civil justice in the history of the federal judicial
system,”96 as a jumping off point, but their plans for the MDL statute
Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), are two other prominent
examples of statutory regulation of procedure that are not ad hoc legislation as we describe
it here. See also, e.g., Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017, H.R. 720, 115th Cong. (as
passed by House, Mar. 10, 2017) (mandating the imposition of sanctions for the filing of
actions found to violate FED. R. CIV. P. 11); Fairness in Class Action Litigation and
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (as passed by
House, Mar. 9, 2017) (imposing an assortment of new limitations on the certification of
class actions under FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
90 Compare infra text accompanying notes 194–95 (discussing the scope of § 524(g)),
with infra text accompanying notes 233–44 (discussing the Dutch WCAM).
91 See infra text accompanying note 302 (discussing § 502 of the Iran Sanctions Act).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 93–99 (discussing the MDL statute); infra text
accompanying notes 227, 233 (discussing the Dutch WCAM).
93 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
94 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 3). On the growth in multidistrict litigation, see Emery G. Lee III et al.,
Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211
(2015), and Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010).
95 Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 831, 838 (2017).
96 William H. Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing
Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 269 (1978). In the
electrical equipment cases, Chief Justice Warren convened an ad hoc committee of judges
to coordinate discovery and other aspects of the litigation. “The Committee had no power
to enter any orders or to require any judge assigned to any of the cases to do anything—its
efforts depended entirely on the voluntary cooperation of the district judges involved . . .
[and] the level of cooperation by district judges was remarkable.” Bradt, supra note 95, at
857.
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were more ambitious. As Professor Andrew Bradt describes in his
illuminating account of the MDL statute’s origins: “The drafters
believed that their creation would reshape federal litigation and
become the primary mechanism for processing the wave of nationwide
mass-tort litigation they predicted was headed the federal courts’
way.”97 The drafters believed that, to accomplish this, the statute
“needed to endow the judges overseeing these litigations with plenary
power to manage them and with the flexibility to innovate when doing
so.”98 Thus, the MDL statute was itself an example of a trans-
substantive ad hoc procedural statute that addressed problems raised
in a particular set of ongoing litigations, as well as a platform for
encouraging and enabling judicial procedural innovations in the form
of ad hoc procedure in future complex litigations.99
The second initial example is the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 (PLRA), which created a unique set of procedural hurdles for
prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement and limited fed-
eral courts’ authority to impose institutional reforms on prisons via
injunctions and consent decrees.100 The PLRA’s institutional reform
provisions originated in conservative opposition to federal court
orders that attempted to ensure that prisons complied with the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.101 At a
July 1995 hearing on a predecessor to the PLRA, the Stop Turning
Out Prisoners (STOP) Act,102 Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne
Abraham expressed outrage103 at a consent decree entered in Harris
v. Philadelphia, a long-running case that sought to remedy unconstitu-
97 Bradt, supra note 95, at 839.
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., Silver & Miller, supra note 71, at 109–10 (discussing ad hoc procedure
within MDL); Linda S. Mullenix, Policing Non-class Aggregate Settlements: Empowering
Judges Through the All Writs Act, 37 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
38–39) (arguing that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides MDL judges wide
discretion in reviewing non-class aggregate settlements).
100 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
101 See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REPRESENTATIVE NEWT
GINGRICH, REPRESENTATIVE DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE
THE NATION 53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (pledging to enact the Taking
Back Our Streets Act, a predecessor to the PLRA). For descriptions of the PLRA’s
origins, see Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law,
90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 610 (2012) (noting that the PLRA was enacted in part due to a
prisoner reduction consent decree in Philadelphia that allegedly led to dangerous inmates
being released from prison), and Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1555, 1565–69 (2003) (describing the legislative debate over the PLRA).
102 H.R. 554, 104th Cong. (introduced Jan. 18, 1995).
103 Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration, Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 49–50 (1995) [hereinafter STOP Act Hearing]
(statement of Lynne Abraham, Philadelphia District Attorney) (arguing that the consent
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tional conditions in the Philadelphia Prison System.104 Abraham
pointed to Patrick Boyle, a member of the audience whose son was
killed in the line of duty, and maintained that the officer’s killer had
been “released under the prison cap” the City of Philadelphia agreed
to in Harris.105 Senator Kay Hutchison (R-TX) similarly testified that
one of her sorority sisters from college—“one of the 10 most beautiful
girls on campus”—was murdered by a prisoner who had been released
pursuant to a consent decree in Ruiz v. Estelle, a long-running prison
conditions case in Texas.106
In direct response to such complaints, the PLRA limits the scope
of injunctions and consent decrees “in any civil action with respect to
prison conditions.”107 Likely responding to DA Abraham’s frustration
at the district court judge’s ruling that she could not intervene in the
Harris case,108 the Act also provides that in any action involving
“prison conditions,” affected government officials are entitled to
intervene and seek the immediate termination of a consent decree or
injunction that fails to comply with the prescribed limitations on the
scope of such decrees and injunctions.109
decree led to an increase in outstanding bench warrants, criminal activity, and the rate of
defendants failing to appear in court).
104 Harris began in 1982 when inmates at Holmesburg Prison filed a class action
complaint against the City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia prison officials alleging that
overcrowding violated their constitutional rights. See Harris v. Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.
82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948, *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2000). The district court abstained from
hearing the case but the abstention decision was reversed on appeal. Harris v. Pernsley,
755 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1985). On remand, the parties entered into a consent decree that
applied to “all past, present, and future inmates of the Philadelphia Prison System.” Harris,
2000 WL 1239948, at *12. There followed many years of litigation and modifications to the
consent decree as Philadelphia sought, with varying degrees of energy, to brings its prisons
into compliance with the standards defined in the consent decree. Following eighteen years
of litigation, the population of the prison system had “nearly doubled.” Id. at *10. The
presiding district judge found that “[a]lthough new facilities have been, and are being built,
they are immediately filled beyond capacity.” Id. For an account of Harris by Judge
Shapiro, see Norma Levy Shapiro, Reflections on the Philadelphia Jails Consent Decree, in
CONSENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS: POLICY ISSUES IN CONSENT DECREES 91–96 (Andrew
Rachlin ed., 2006).
105 STOP Act Hearing, supra note 103, at 47.
106 Id. at 8.
107 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). For a description of how PLRA’s limitations on remedial
orders parallel federal interventions previously rejected by the Supreme Court, see Mark
Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47
DUKE L.J. 1, 51 (1997).
108 District Judge Norma Shapiro observed, when terminating the Harris consent
decree, that “the District Attorney led the efforts to enact the PLRA.” Harris, 2000 WL
1239948, at *8.
109 18 U.S.C § 3626(b)(2). On the connection between Harris and the intervention
provision, see Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts,
and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 170 n.26 (2013) (noting that Harris is “[t]he
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In addition to modifying other aspects of prison litigation, the
PLRA aimed squarely at changing the course of proceedings in Harris
and Ruiz. In this sense, it epitomizes the process of ad hoc procedure-
making via federal legislation. While the Philadelphia jails remained
overcrowded four years after the PLRA became law, Judge Shapiro
noted that the PLRA tied her hands in the Harris litigation because
the law made existing decrees “unenforceable if challenged.”110
Insofar as it was motivated by lawmakers’ desire to address litigation
in Harris (as well as other similar cases), the PLRA can be understood
as an example of a substance-specific and politically motivated ad hoc
procedural statute. The Act remains deeply controversial.111
D. The Challenge of Ad Hoc Procedural Legislation
Many of the risks of ad hoc procedural legislation follow both
from the fact that it is often substance specific and from the appear-
ance that it is motivated by political considerations.
Consider the PLRA. Critics charge that the PLRA does not seek
to ensure that prison litigation is resolved fairly and efficiently, but “is
explicitly dedicated to creating unequal justice under law.”112 The Act
accomplishes this “by establishing a code of special restrictive rules”
which applies to a single “unpopular group of litigants” that does not
enjoy strong representation in the federal legislative process.113 In
critics’ view, the PLRA’s special-purpose code of procedure conflicts
with courts’ obligation to treat litigants fairly and impartially, and cre-
ates unjustified transaction costs for courts, litigants, and attorneys
who must apply the new special-purpose code in covered cases.114
If one credits the critics’ view, the PLRA’s singling out of a par-
ticular class of litigants for special treatment, based on legislators’ dis-
pleasure with their success in prior litigation, also raises questions of
institutional legitimacy. Separation-of-powers theory traditionally pos-
ited the necessity of a sharp distinction between legislative and judi-
lawsuit that looms the largest” in the PLRA’s legislative history), and Richard J. Costa,
Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Legitimate Attempt to Curtail Frivolous
Inmate Lawsuits and End the Alleged Micro-Management of State Prisons or a Violation of
Separation of Powers?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 331 (1997).
110 Harris, 2000 WL 1239948, at *10.
111 Compare, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (reasoning that the PLRA
reflects Congress’s judgment that “[w]hat this country needs . . . is fewer and better
prisoner suits”), with Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American
Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1672 (2016) (arguing that the PLRA inhibits use of civil
litigation as a mechanism for developing and enforcing constitutional rights).
112 John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 429 (2001).
113 Id.
114 See id. at 429–33; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 107, at 48–70.
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cial functions, which is violated when the legislature revises final
judgments or directs that ongoing cases be resolved in a particular
manner.115 Since the nineteenth century, U.S. constitutional law has
struggled to identify the precise circumstances in which legislation
invades the judicial power reserved to Article III courts.116 Applying
doctrine that attempts to mark the boundary line between Articles I
and III, the Supreme Court rejected an Article III challenge to the
PLRA on the ground that it changed the substantive law applicable to
prisoner claims on a prospective basis.117 Critics charge, however, that
the Act’s disruption of final judgments obtained “through years of
labor,” which reflected courts’ considered application of constitutional
norms, “significantly compromised the independence of the
judiciary.”118
We identify five overarching concerns with the legitimacy of ad
hoc procedural statutes, most of which can be illustrated through the
PLRA example. First, the statute was deliberately limited to specific
claims or litigants.119 Lawmakers who voted on it did not operate
behind a veil of ignorance or act on the basis of recommendations
developed by technocratic experts, but could anticipate precisely how
the law would affect specific, ongoing litigation.120 This knowledge
115 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995) (“This sense of a sharp
necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power, prompted by the crescendo of
legislative interference with private judgments of the courts, triumphed among the Framers
of the new Federal Constitution.”).
116 That Congress may change the law applicable to a pending case has been clear since
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855), which
upheld a statute that “declared” two bridges that were the subject of nuisance actions “to
be lawful structures in their present positions and elevations.” Beyond this basic principle,
the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate standards to determine when other
legislative interventions that affect ongoing litigation exceed Congress’s power under
Article I or infringe courts’ Article III authority. Compare Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240
(invalidating an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act that directed courts to reopen
certain judgments previously dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds), and United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871) (refusing to give effect to a statutory
provision stating that presidential pardons could not be used as evidence in actions to
recover damages for property seized during the Civil War and directing the Supreme Court
to dismiss actions based on a pardon for lack of jurisdiction), with Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 429 (1992) (rejecting an Article III challenge to a statute in
which Congress “determine[d] and direct[ed]” that compliance with certain standards
satisfied the statutory requirements at issue in two ongoing actions (quoting Act of Oct. 23,
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747)). See also infra text
accompanying note 304 (discussing Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016)).
117 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000).
118 Boston, supra note 112, at 447–49.
119 Ad hoc procedural legislation that is trans-substantive, like the MDL statute, can
generate its own issues if it is overly broad.
120 See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA’s origins in the
Philadelphia prison overcrowding litigation).
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 18 Side B      10/12/2017   08:00:42
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 18 Side B      10/12/2017   08:00:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU401.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-OCT-17 14:40
794 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:767
raises the question whether lawmakers who approve ad hoc legislation
are motivated by the desire to reward a popular group (or punish an
unpopular one) rather than pursuing some more neutral definition of
public policy.121 We term this the “legislative partiality” problem.
Second, ad hoc procedural legislation that is limited to specific
claims or litigants creates transaction costs for courts, litigants, and
attorneys who must operate under its new, special-purpose regime.
When an ad hoc statute is over- or underbroad relative to its ani-
mating objective, it threatens the ideal that like cases be treated alike.
Carried to its logical limits, ad hoc procedural legislation created in
response to problems revealed in specific cases threatens to create a
garden of forking paths in which no two cases are treated alike. This
can be either because a substance-specific statute like the PLRA sin-
gles out prison litigation for special (negative) treatment, or because
an ad-hoc-procedure-encouraging law like the MDL statute permits
so much discretion that judges can cater procedures individually to
each litigation.122 We term this the “special treatment” problem.
Third, ad hoc procedural legislation like the PLRA raises ques-
tions of institutional legitimacy. If the separation of powers prevents
the legislature from dictating the outcome of pending cases or
reopening judgments that have become final, can the legislature none-
theless change the procedures through which claims are resolved in a
way that makes particular litigation outcomes more likely, if not inevi-
table? We term this the problem of “legislative interference.”
Fourth, the time frame in which ad hoc legislation is enacted
departs from the rule-of-law ideal that legislation operate prospec-
tively. Because ad hoc procedural legislation is enacted midstream—
when ongoing litigation has revealed a problem that cannot be
resolved through the ordinary processes of law—it involves an intui-
tively troubling form of retroactivity.123 Admittedly, Supreme Court
doctrine denies that “jurisdictional” or “procedural” changes are ever
121 See Marcus, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 64, at 773–74 (defining neutrality and
arguing that it “is at least a pursuable goal in designing procedures for civil litigation”).
122 See Bradt, supra note 95, at 839; Silver & Miller, supra note 71, at 109–10.
123 In contrast to Rules amendments, which also may apply retroactively, see supra note
37, ad hoc procedural statutes purposefully seek to affect particular pending cases. This
feature distinguishes ad hoc procedure from procedures that are changed prospectively in
response to perceived injustices in particular cases. See, e.g., Anne Lawson Braswell, Note,
Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity
Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 620 (1987) (explaining that Congress enacted the
“Hinkley Amendment,” FED. R. EVID. 704(b), after a jury found would-be presidential
assassin John Hinkley not guilty by reason of insanity). Such procedures also suffer from
legislative myopia and other problems, but they are not the focus of this Article.
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retroactive in a manner that offends due process.124 But this principle,
based on the intuition that procedural changes merely affect the way
that rights are enforced rather than defining primary obligations, has
more intuitive appeal when applied to procedure produced through
the traditional model. It hardly eliminates the concern about ad hoc
procedural legislation’s retroactivity.125 For example, Section 524(g)
unlocked two billion dollars in value for Manville’s shareholders by
reducing the value of asbestos claims against the firm to a fraction of
their pre-bankruptcy value and greatly reducing the costly uncertainty
that accompanied those claims.126 The “procedural” nature of this
intervention does not answer whether it was fair to retroactively
change the way that Manville’s asbestos liability was resolved after a
substantial number of claims against Manville had accrued. We term
this the “retroactivity” problem.
Lastly, we show below that because ad hoc procedural legislation
is enacted in the midst of litigation, it is less likely to be the product of
sustained consideration of all of its potential consequences than gen-
erally applicable procedures.127 The (comparatively) slap-dash
manner in which ad hoc procedural legislation is enacted increases the
likelihood that it will fail to anticipate—or address—problems that
arise when it is put to use. This, in turn, may generate demand for new
legislation. We term this the problem of “legislative myopia.”
*  *  *
Ad hoc procedural legislation, then, presents a multi-faceted
challenge to the traditional image of procedure-making. Not only does
ad hoc procedural legislation depart from the norms of legislative
impartiality and generality that have long guided the federal
rulemaking process, but it is also made on the fly, challenging the
assumption that the fairness and legitimacy of adjudication follows
from cases being decided according to procedures established in
124 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274–75 (1994) (discussing the
lightweight presumption against statutory retroactivity that applies to jurisdictional and
procedural legislation).
125 See id. at 275 n.29 (rejecting the suggestion “that concerns about retroactivity have
no application to procedural rules”).
126 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Manville’s sale to Berkshire
Hathaway); infra notes 197–98 (discussing the prevalence of bankruptcy filings under
524(g) for other asbestos manufacturers).
127 On the standard process for making federal procedural rules, see Stephen B.
Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1543, 1546 (2014) (describing statutory changes in the 1980s, including open meeting
requirements and multiple levels of review, that slow federal court rulemaking). See also
sources cited supra note 30 (noting that a federal rule takes two to three years or longer to
navigate the rulemaking process).
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advance of disputes that aspire to ensure that similar cases are treated
alike. Ad hoc procedures raise these legitimacy questions even when
they are enacted as legislation because the legislative process, unlike
the federal rulemaking process, does not incorporate procedural safe-
guards that are meant to ensure the procedures’ impartiality. This is
not to say that procedure must necessarily be trans-substantive, or
prospective, or enacted through the Enabling Act in order to be legiti-
mate. Rather, we claim that procedure that shares those features
enjoys a presumption of legitimacy; without them, legitimacy must
come from somewhere else.
With this challenge in mind, the following Part traces the devel-
opment of four ad hoc procedural statutes in three legal systems. The
case studies reveal a tension that is fundamental to the legitimacy of
ad hoc procedural legislation. While the profiled statutes appear to
transgress the rule-of-law norms that traditionally animated proce-
dural design, they also share the Federal Rules’ basic objective of
ensuring that claims are resolved “on the merits.”128 Often, ad hoc
procedural statutes restore the legal system’s ability to provide a good
that it provides in ordinary litigation. This restorative function sug-
gests that ad hoc procedural legislation performs a vital—if poorly
understood—role in ensuring that the complexity of the modern
world does not prevent the civil justice system from providing the
basic goods it was established in the first instance to provide.
II
CASE STUDIES OF AD HOC PROCEDURAL LEGISLATION
Ad hoc procedural legislation provides an important gateway to
understanding the broader phenomenon of ad hoc procedure. To illu-
minate the problems that motivate such legislation and the choices
that legislatures face in enacting it, this Part profiles three problems
that prompted legislatures to consider ad hoc procedural statutes, and
the legislation that resulted.129 These studies showcase a tension at the
128 See generally Subrin, supra note 34, at 986–87 (tracing the importance of the “on the
merits” concept in the development of the Federal Rules).
129 The statutes profiled here are far from the only examples of ad hoc procedural
legislation. See, e.g., supra notes 93–111 and accompanying text (describing how the MDL
statute and the PLRA also qualify as ad hoc procedural statutes); see also, e.g., An Act for
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005)
(granting a single federal district court jurisdiction to adjudicate any federal or
constitutional “suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo” if the suit was filed
“within 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act”); Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401–09, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001)
(prescribing procedures, enacted after September 11, 2001, for claims arising out of
terrorist attacks); cf. Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination:
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core of ad hoc procedural legislation: While such legislation conflicts
with traditional images of procedure and procedure-making, it often
serves important interests, most prominently by overcoming proce-
dural problems that cannot be resolved using ordinary processes of
law. The case studies show that the problems that motivate ad hoc
procedural legislation are not unique to the United States, and that
constitutional law has only a modest influence on the design of ad hoc
procedural legislation. Whether it occurs in the United States or
abroad, ad hoc procedural legislation is only weakly constrained by
norms of the separation of powers and due process.
A. Adjudication: The Deutsche Telekom Act and the Rise of
Aggregate Litigation in Germany
As the asbestos litigation crisis illustrates, the unexpected filing of
a large number of lawsuits can overwhelm courts’ ability to adjudicate
claims using existing procedures. Germany faced a similar crisis in the
wake of an alleged securities fraud perpetrated by Deutsche Telekom.
As in the asbestos litigation context, legislative intervention was nec-
essary to devise an effective mechanism for handling the massive
number of claims filed in that case. The controversy led to a statute
known as the Deutsche Telekom Act, which sought to tackle the
problem of adjudicating the claims, rather than settling them.
1. The Deutsche Telekom Crisis
In 1996, the German government privatized the national telecom-
munications carrier, Deutsche Telekom (DT), in what was then
Europe’s largest initial public offering.130 The DT offering was a cru-
cial part of a larger government effort to inspire ordinary investors to
participate in the securities markets instead of stashing savings under
the proverbial mattress.131 In the lead-up to DT’s IPO, a media blitz
portrayed DT stock as a conservative investment that would generate
Lessons from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (2007) (analyzing the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act).
130 See John Schmid, Demand Said to Soar for 500 Million Shares: Telekom Sets Price
Range for Its IPO, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/22/
business/worldbusiness/demand-said-to-soar-for-500-million-shares-telekom.html.
131 The campaign portrayed DT shares as Volksaktie or “the people’s share[s].” See
Michael Halberstam, The American Advantage in Civil Procedure? An Autopsy of the
Deutsche Telekom Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 817, 832 (2016). The actor Manfred
Krug—a German Fred Thompson “who usually played trustworthy, down-to-earth,
common-people characters”—appeared in television commercials and “advised everybody
to buy Telekom shares.” Axel Halfmeier, Litigation Without End? The Deutsche Telekom
Case and the German Approach to Private Enforcement of Securities Law, in CLASS
ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION 279, 281 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
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a reliable income stream for investors.132 The campaign persuaded
many Germans to buy DT stock.133 In 2000 and 2001, however, DT
issued unscheduled disclosures about its real estate assets, its acquisi-
tion of VoiceStream, and its sale of $8.2 billion of Sprint common
stock.134 By December 2000, DT stock was trading at thirty percent of
its post-IPO high.135
The German Civil Procedure Code (ZPO) lacks a class action
mechanism, and German courts have not traditionally entertained
U.S.-style private securities litigation.136 Yet the strengthening of E.U.
disclosure requirements in the years before DT’s IPO137 and the
seemingly blatant fraud committed by the company’s managers raised
the prospect that investors could recover some of their losses. As DT’s
stock price plummeted in the fall of 2000, plaintiffs’ attorney Andreas
Tilp appeared in a television interview and opined that the company
could be held liable for misstatements in its IPO prospectus.138 Inves-
tors flooded Tilp’s office with inquiries, and he soon assembled a port-
folio of thousands of clients.139 To finance litigation against DT, Tilp
and his plaintiffs used a form of legal expense insurance that most
German households carry to cover litigation over small-scale personal
and commercial disputes.140
Tilp and other plaintiffs’ attorneys began to file lawsuits en
masse. Under German jurisdictional law, all claims that arose out of
132 See Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 281.
133 See id.
134 The 2000 disclosure revealed DT would purchase the U.S. telecommunications
company VoiceStream for the astounding price of fifty billion dollars. DT’s stock price
dropped thirteen percent on the day of the announcement and the purchase—on the brink
of a financial downturn—turned out to be a terrible business decision. The 2001 disclosure
announced the reevaluation of DT’s real estate portfolio at two billion euros below the
company’s previous evaluation. The stock price again dropped precipitously. See
Halberstam, supra note 131, at 834. One news report put the cumulative stock drop at
eighty-six percent. Corinna Budras, Litigation Logjam: In a Case That Could Drag on Six
More Years, a Frankfurt Judge Must Review 15,000 Separate Shareholder Claims Against
Deutsche Telekom. No Wonder Europe Is Quickly Discovering the Benefits of Class
Actions, NAT’L POST, Nov. 24, 2004, at 10, 2004 WLNR 12484873.
135 Halberstam, supra note 131, at 833–34, 863.
136 See id. at 843.
137 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe,
26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 379, 380 (2005) (discussing the Financial Services Action Plan
and Prospectus Directive, and efforts to implement those measures at the E.U. and
national level).
138 See Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 282.
139 Andreas W. Tilp & Thomas A. Roth, The German Capital Market Model
Proceedings Act as Illustrated by the Example of the Frankfurt Deutsche Telekom Claims,
in MASS TORTS IN EUROPE: CASES AND REFLECTIONS 131, 132 (Willem H. van Boom &
Gerhard Wagner, eds., 2014).
140 See Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 283.
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the IPO were assigned to Judge Meinrad Wo¨sthoff of the Frankfurt
trial court.141 At the peak of filings, documents literally were brought
to the court by the truckload.142 Judge Wo¨sthoff estimated that claims
against DT were equivalent to ten years of the court’s ordinary com-
mercial docket.143
2. Judicial Management Fails
The Frankfurt court was not equipped to handle litigation of this
size or complexity. The ZPO is premised on a bipolar, plaintiff v.
defendant model of litigation.144 At the time the DT cases were filed,
the Frankfurt court lacked an electronic filing system and worked off
hard-copy papers. Judge Wo¨sthoff personally entered filings on Excel
spreadsheets.145
Judge Wo¨sthoff’s first instinct for handling the flood of claims
was to use the court’s inherent authority to devise a trial plan that
would allow issues common to the DT claims to be resolved in a single
authoritative proceeding. The device the judge proposed resembled
the “issue class action” that some U.S. courts have used146 following
the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.147 A “test
case” would first be heard to permit the court to resolve common
issues.148 In theory, the decision in the test case would streamline later
cases by establishing fact-findings that would not have to be re-
litigated. This court-devised procedure failed to resolve the DT
claims, however, because German law generally does not allow find-
ings from one case to be carried over to another.149 In common law
terms, the “test case” did not have issue-preclusive effect.
Pressure on the Frankfurt court increased when a June 2004 deci-
sion of the Federal Constitutional Court held that intentionally
141 See id.
142 See Benjamin Lee & Benedict Heil, The Role of Private Litigation 5 (Spring 2016)
(unpublished seminar paper, University of Pennsylvania Law School),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=fisch_2016.
143 See id.
144 BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE],
DISKUSSIONSENTWURF: GESETZ ZUR WEITEREN VERBESSERUNG DES ANLEGERSCHUTZES
[DISCUSSION DRAFT] (2004) [hereinafter KAPMUG DRAFT].
145 See Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 283.
146 See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 2012) (allowing class-wide treatment for the issue of whether an employer’s
policies constituted discrimination against African-American employees under Title VII).
147 See 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (interpreting Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement to
require that a common issue drive the resolution of the class’s claims).
148 See Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 284 (describing the process by which the test case
would be chosen).
149 See id. at 283 (noting that there was no rule in the German Code of Civil Procedure
that allowed a test case to be used in this manner).
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staying the DT claims, as some U.S. courts had done during the
asbestos litigation crisis,150 would violate the plaintiffs’ rights under
the German Constitution.151 In response to the decision, Frankfurt
judges began what a press account describes as a “mutiny.”152 To
enable the court to handle the litigation, judges demanded legislation
that strengthened the legal basis for resolving the DT claims via the
“test case” procedure. A German lawyer observed: “This was a cry for
help, directed at the federal government in Berlin.”153
3. Legislative Recognition of the Test Case Procedure
The Berlin government received the message. In April 2004, the
Federal Ministry of Justice circulated a discussion draft of a bill that
codified the test case procedure Judge Wo¨sthoff devised.154 The Min-
istry formally proposed legislation in November 2004.155 On June 17,
2005, the Bundestag passed the Kapitalmusterverfahrensgesetz, popu-
larly known as the KapMuG or “Deutsche Telekom” Act.156
The Act authorizes the trial court to certify a “model case” to the
intermediate court of appeals, which serves as the trier of fact for
“[a]ll points of dispute” identified in the trial court’s certification
150 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 748 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993) (describing courts’ different efforts at addressing floods of asbestos litigation,
including “creat[ing] an inactive docket of cases with plaintiffs who have few if any
objective symptoms”).
151 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1196/04, July 27, 2004, http://www.bverfg.de/e/
rk20040727_1bvr119604.html.
152 Budras, supra note 134. That month, the President of the Court issued a press release
that was equal parts mea culpa and a plea for institutional reform, describing the influx of
extension requests from 630 different law firms on the last days before the filing deadline:
“Every single file had to be physically brought into the judge’s office, so that he could
decide whether the deadline extension should be granted. . . . [A]n employee transfer[red]
the decision into the computer system . . . and sen[t] it by mail to the affected parties.”
Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 284 (quoting a June 8, 2004 press release of the Regional
Court of Frankfurt am Main).
153 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 284.
154 KAPMUG DRAFT, supra note 144, at 18–19.
155 Budras, supra note 134.
156 Halberstam, supra note 131, at 847. As scholars have noted, “the KapMuG was
motivated [in substantial part] by the fact that the biggest investors’ action in Germany, the
Deutsche Telekom case which involves more than 15,000 individual plaintiffs, 2100
individual lawsuits and 700 plaintiffs’ attorneys, has congested the Frankfurt trial court to
an unacceptable degree.” Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets
Model Case Act (KapMuG): A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of
Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 20 EUR. J. FIN. 361, 362 (2014); see
also Gerhard Wagner, Collective Redress—Categories of Loss and Legislative Options, 127
LAW Q. REV. 55, 65 (2011) (“This case, which threatened to clog the Frankfurt court for
years, even provoked the intervention of the federal legislator [sic], who moved fast to pass
the [KapMuG].”).
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order.157 The appellate court’s findings and conclusions in the model
case are binding in all cases identified by the certification order. Liti-
gants may not opt out of the model case procedure. In solidifying the
legal basis for the test-case procedure, the Act seeks both to overcome
the crisis that caused the judges of the Frankfurt court to mutiny in the
DT litigation and to strengthen enforcement of German securities
law. As the bill’s statement on the need for legislation observed, the
ZPO does not provide effective mechanisms for asserting claims that
involved small, dispersed damages. By reducing the transaction costs
of private securities enforcement, the DT Act “contribute[s] to a
stricter enforcement of the capital market laws.”158
The Act changed the procedure for the DT litigation midstream,
raising concerns about legislative interference and retroactivity.159
After it was enacted, plaintiffs moved for and were granted certifica-
tion of a model case proceeding.160 Furthermore, the DT Act is
expressly limited to claims for securities fraud or violations of Ger-
many’s Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act,161 potentially raising
a special treatment problem. During the legislative debate, members
of the Bundestag referred to the statute as the “lex Telekom” because
of its origins in the DT litigation.162
If the DT Act had allowed the Frankfurt court to successfully
resolve the DT litigation, it would have presented a straightforward
tradeoff between pragmatic problem-solving and adherence to the
traditional image of procedural design. While enacted in the midst of
litigation and limited to a specific substantive area, a successful statute
could have claimed that these departures from traditional procedural
design were necessary to handle the crush of DT claims that Tilp and
his colleagues filed. As a normative matter, the question would have
been whether the DT Act’s violence to rule-of-law values reflected in
157 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case
Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 2438, § 4(2), translation at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Germany_Legislation_1
.pdf.
158 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 285; see also KAPMUG DRAFT, supra note 144, at
18–22.
159 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case
Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BGBL I at 2442, § 20; Halberstam, supra note 131, at 847.
160 See Landgericht Frankfurt am Main [LG Frankfurt/M.] [Frankfurt District Court]
July 11, 2006, 27 ZEITSCRIFT FU¨R WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1730, 2006 (lower court’s brief
of thirty-three issues for resolution by the intermediate appellate court); see also
Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 286–90 (outlining a range of procedural issues in the early
years of the case).
161 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case
Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BGBL I at 2437, § 1(1).
162 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 284.
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traditional procedural design was justified by the justice that the
statute delivered.
A striking feature of the DT Act, however, is the extent to which
it failed to accomplish the objectives that its backers set out for it, at
least initially.163 The DT litigation began in 2005 and has “dragged
on” for more than a decade since164 as a result of appeals to the Fed-
eral Court of Justice, procedural “ping-pong” between the trial court
and court of appeals, protracted debates over whether individual cases
would be stayed during model case proceedings, and the retirement of
the presiding appellate judge in the midst of the model case proceed-
ings.165 By way of contrast, a U.S. securities class action seeking dam-
ages for securities law violations during DT’s IPO settled in January
2005 for $120 million.166 Commentators see the KapMuG’s failure to
deliver justice in the litigation that inspired it as evidence that the
statute’s basic design is flawed.167
But the legislation’s shortcomings also illustrate a potential
model through which ad hoc procedural legislation can be adapted in
light of experience and integrated into the broader fabric of proce-
163 See E´rica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate
Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63
EMORY L.J. 1383, 1491 (2014) (noting the “limited success” of investor actions under the
DT Act).
164 Karin Matussek & Stefan Nicola, Death of a Plaintiff: A Cautionary Tale for VW
Investors, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-
27/death-of-a-plaintiff-a-cautionary-german-tale-for-vw-investors; see also DEUTSCHE
TELEKOM, THE 2016 FINANCIAL YEAR 108 (2017) (listing ongoing prospectus liability
proceedings as a risk factor for the company).
165 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 287.
166 Halberstam, supra note 131, at 820. This comparison reflects a possible alternative
timeline, but is not intended to take sides in the extensive debates about the fairness,
efficiency, or wisdom of any particular aspects of U.S. securities class actions. Cf., e.g.,
Matteo Gargantini & Verity Winship, Private Ordering of Shareholder Litigation in the EU
and the US, in THE ELGAR HANDBOOK FOR REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
(Sean Griffith et al. eds., forthcoming 2017/2018); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1534 (2006).
167 Halberstam criticizes the KapMuG for lacking discovery mechanisms, which he
argues are effective at promoting settlement (and thereby cabining lengthy litigation) as
well as deterring misconduct. Id. at 865–66. Feess and Halfmeier criticize the procedure for
requiring individual shareholders to file their own claims to be a part of the model
proceeding (rather than permitting opt-out aggregation or simplifying the mechanisms for
opting in). Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 156, at 363. Brigitte Haar agrees and points out
that requiring each claimant to file separately may increase court congestion or decrease
claimants’ incentives to participate in the litigation, undermining the effectiveness of the
Act’s regulatory goals. See Brigitte Haar, Investor Protection Through Model Case
Procedures – Implementing Collective Goals and Individual Rights Under the 2012
Amendment of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) 22–23 (Ctr. for
Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2013/21), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2352263.
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dure, thus mitigating the legislative myopia problem. The original
Deutsche Telekom Act contained a sunset clause which provided that
the Act would expire on November 1, 2010.168 As the statute
approached its expiration date, it was extended for two years “to gain
time for discussion.”169 In 2012, the Act was renewed through 2020170
with modifications that were designed to facilitate aggregate settle-
ments171 and streamline model case proceedings.172 In August 2016, a
German court certified a model case proceeding for shareholder
claims against Volkswagen that arose out of the clean diesel scandal,
the second major test of the statute.173
The Bundestag’s decision to extend the DT Act through 2020 and
the plaintiffs’ reliance on the statute in the VW litigation illustrate
tensions fundamental to ad hoc procedural legislation. For private liti-
gation to “contribute to a stricter enforcement of [Germany’s] capital
market laws,”174 plaintiffs require some mechanism for asserting
claims that avoids the staggering transaction costs of individual litiga-
tion under the ZPO’s ordinary rules.175 Reluctant to make far-
reaching changes in response to the problems of a specific litigation,
the Bundestag created a specialized procedure that changed the rules
of the road midstream for the DT litigation, then revised that proce-
168 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case
Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BGBL I at 2442, § 20.
169 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 293.
170 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case
Act], Oct. 19, 2012, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] § 28, translation at http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_kapmug/englisch_kapmug.pdf.
171 See Noah R. Wortman & Marc Schiefer, Top Tips for Recovering Securities Damages
Within Europe, INVESTMENT EUR. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.investmenteurope.net/
opinion/top-tips-recovering-securities-damages-within-europe (noting that settlement is
confirmed if seventy percent of claimants agree). But see Haar, supra note 167, at 25–27
(criticizing the 2012 amendments as insufficient to address the Act’s shortcomings).
172 See generally Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 156 (analyzing the Act’s effectiveness as
a mechanism for enforcing German prospectus law).
173 Alonso Diaz, Germany Court: Lawsuits Against Volkswagen May Proceed, JURIST
(Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/08/germany-court-lawsuits-against-
volkswagen-may-proceed.php.
174 Halfmeier, supra note 131, at 285.
175 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law,
Culture, and Incentives, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6). For
analyses of how changes in U.S. procedure have contributed to the demand for private
enforcement mechanisms outside the United States, see Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation
Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1090–98, 1110–15 (2015) (examining the connection
between restrictions on personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, absention comity, and
the presumption against extraterritoriality in U.S. courts, and the adoption of American-
style procedures in foreign courts), and David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 65–82 (2014) (describing how concerns about interference in foreign
regulation have driven changes in U.S. doctrine governing forum selection, arbitration,
personal jurisdiction, and extraterritoriality).
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dure in time to be used for VW. While the interventions departed
from the traditional image of civil procedure insofar as they targeted a
specific category of litigation and changed the rules of the road as
litigation progressed, they also addressed a glaring procedural
problem and helped strengthen the enforcement of German securities
law. Without the Deutsche Telekom Act, the DT or VW litigation in
Germany would be nearly impossible to bring to a satisfying conclu-
sion for any of the parties.
B. Collective Settlement in the United States: Asbestos Personal
Injury Settlement Trusts Under Section 524(g)
In the era of “the vanishing trial,”176 most claims are settled
rather than adjudicated. Settlement might seem to provide a solution
to the problems of scale that frustrated aggregate adjudication in the
DT litigation. But no less than mass adjudication, mass settlement
requires a supporting infrastructure that can, for example, define the
settling parties’ authority, protect against self-dealing, and ensure the
fairness of settlements that are agreed to without the individual con-
sent of each party that the settlement binds.177 In the absence of gen-
erally applicable procedures for effecting mass settlements, the need
for peace has prompted ad hoc procedural legislation in both the
United States and Europe.
1. Codifying the Power to Redirect Asbestos Claims
The leading example in U.S. law is § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy
Code. As the Introduction describes, § 524(g) was enacted in the
midst of unsuccessful efforts to resolve the asbestos litigation crisis
outside of bankruptcy. In the Manville bankruptcy, the district court
and bankruptcy court had jointly ordered a channeling injunction to
redirect asbestos claims against Manville to a freestanding trust
funded by the company’s stock.178
176 See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
177 See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L.
REV. 979, 1022–23 (2010) (discussing ethical problems that arise in aggregate settlements);
Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1618–20 (2004)
(demonstrating that mass settlements inevitably give rise to governance questions that law
explicitly or implicitly addresses).
178 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1988); supra note 18
and accompanying text.
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The insurance companies that ultimately would be responsible for
the claims insisted on the channeling injunction.179 But the courts’
authority to issue such an injunction, which crafted an ad hoc proce-
dure to control claims that had not yet accrued, was hazy.180 The mar-
kets’ uncertainty about whether the injunction would “stick” put
downward pressure on the reorganized company’s stock price.
Because the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust was the
majority owner of the reorganized company, doubts about the injunc-
tion depleted the capital available to pay claimants who had been
harmed by Manville’s products.181 Thus, “the reorganized Johns-
Manville firm, asbestos claimants, insurers who had participated in the
bankruptcy, and other industrial firms facing mounting asbestos lia-
bility all had a combined interest in securing explicit statutory
authority for the Manville innovations.”182
Faced with the possibility of the reorganization failing, Manville’s
managers turned to Congress. The public lobbying effort for § 524(g)
began in July 1991, when Manville’s CEO, W.T. Stephens, appeared
before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.183
Stephens testified that legislation “to codify the permanent nature of
court-ordered and -issued injunctions in the context of a chapter 11
reorganization proceeding” was needed “to create hundreds of mil-
179 As described by Justice David Souter, insurers “agreed to provide most of the initial
corpus of the Trust, with a payment of $770 million to the bankruptcy estate, $80 million of
it from Travelers. . . . There would have been no such payment without the injunction . . . .”
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 141 (2009) (citations omitted). In Bailey,
insurers successfully urged the Supreme Court to read the channeling injunction to
prohibit “state-law actions against Travelers based on allegations either of its own
wrongdoing while acting as Manville’s insurer or of its misuse of information obtained
from Manville as its insurer.” Id. at 140.
180 The judge issued the injunction pursuant to his authority under § 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which provides that, subject to exceptions, a bankruptcy court “may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105. But recent amendments to bankruptcy court
powers provided that core proceedings by the bankruptcy court could not include “the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11.” 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). For the discussion of the issuance of the original injunction, see In
re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 842–43 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991),
vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
181 See Charlier, supra note 19, at B4 (discussing market responses to the reorganized
entity).
182 Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 1014–15 (2012).
183 Special Problems in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 61–81 (1991) (statement of
W.T. Stephens, Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Manville
Corp.).
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lions of dollars to pay some sick people.”184 The company’s proposed
legislation was drafted to apply to all asbestos manufacturers to head
off a constitutional challenge under Article I Section 8, which autho-
rizes Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies.”185 This provision reflects the Constitution’s opposition to
legislative favoritism—the concern of the special treatment problem—
in the bankruptcy context.
The Senate passed Stephens’s proposed amendments, but they
were dropped in a House-Senate conference committee that was
negotiating amendments to the Bankruptcy Code after opposition
emerged from organized labor and W.R. Grace, a Manville compet-
itor that had not entered bankruptcy.186 Grace feared, presciently,
that if Manville were allowed to channel claims to its trust where they
would be paid at a discount, asbestos plaintiffs would seek to hold
Grace and other manufacturers liable for asbestos injuries on joint
and several liability theories.
Within a year, Stephens reappeared before subcommittees of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees.187 He characterized his leg-
islative proposal as a “win-win”188 that permitted Manville to unlock
the value of its stock and, in so doing, “produce[ ] a half-a-billion dol-
lars in additional assets for the trust to use to pay claims.”189 Robert
Falise, managing director of the settlement trust, and Robert
Steinberg, a veteran asbestos-claim plaintiffs’ attorney, both sup-
ported the legislation.190 This time, the bill encountered strenuous
opposition from a group of asbestos manufacturers represented by
184 Id. at 61.
185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). In Railway Labor Executives’
Association v. Gibbons, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s authority under the
Bankruptcy Clause did not allow amendments to the bankruptcy code that applied to only
one debtor. 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982). The Court distinguished a law that applied to only
one debtor from one that represented “a response either to the particular problems of
major railroad bankruptcies or to any geographically isolated problem: it is a response to
the problems caused by the bankruptcy of one railroad.” Id. at 470. Section 524(g) gave
effect to Gibbons by establishing a scheme that applied to all companies facing asbestos-
based liability—but no further.
186 Kenneth H. Bacon, Conferees Drop Bid to Shield Manville in Drive to Agree on
Bankruptcy Reform, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1992, at A5.
187 House Manville Hearings, supra note 23, at 7–24 (statement of W.T. Stephens,
Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Officer, Manville Corp.); Senate Manville
Hearings, supra note 8, at 26–30 (statement of W. Thomas Stephens, Chairman & Chief
Executive Officer, Manville Corp.).
188 Senate Manville Hearings, supra note 8, at 28 (statement of W. Thomas Stephens,
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Manville Corp.).
189 House Manville Hearings, supra note 23, at 9 (statement of W.T. Stephens,
Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Officer, Manville Corp.).
190 See Senate Manville Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of Robert A. Falise,
Chairman & Managing Trustee, Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust); id. at 45
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Debevoise & Plimpton’s Roger Podesta, who claimed that they would
be pushed into bankruptcy if Manville were permitted to channel
claims to its personal injury trust.191 Their effort to kill the bill came
too late, however. With plaintiffs, the debtor, and the future claims
representative all backing § 524(g), the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees reported the provision, and Congress enacted it in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.192
2. Aftereffects of Codifying the Manville Trust
Section 524(g) authorized a bankruptcy court to enjoin the prose-
cution of asbestos claims against a reorganized asbestos manufacturer
if the manufacturer established a trust to pay personal injury claims,
the debtor funded the trust and committed to continued funding, and
the reorganization cleared a number of procedural hurdles.193 The
statute was limited to asbestos claims,194 and expressly provided that it
would be available for use in ongoing proceedings.195 After the statute
was enacted, the district court reissued the channeling injunction in
the Manville reorganization,196 leading to the firm’s recovery and
eventual sale to Berkshire Hathaway.
Section 524(g) succeeded in saving Manville from having to liqui-
date and made more money available to asbestos claimants than alter-
native mechanisms for resolving the company’s asbestos liability
would have. In doing so, however, the statute did violence to the idea
that legitimacy of judicial action depends on courts acting through
even-handed procedures that are established in advance of a dispute.
The statute also had follow-on effects that Congress at the very
least failed to address. As W.R. Grace had predicted, Manville’s suc-
cessful bid to redirect its asbestos liability to a trust where claims
would be paid at a fraction of their value in the tort system created
intense pressure for other asbestos manufacturers to reorganize.197 By
2007, “nearly all of the major manufacturers” had reorganized via
§ 524(g).198
(statement of Robert B. Steinberg, Selected Counsel for the Beneficiaries, Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust).
191 See House Manville Hearings, supra note 23, at 26–39 (statement of Roger E.
Podesta, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton) (explaining the effects of the trust on “solvent
codefendants” acting in the tort system rather than a bankruptcy trust).
192 Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)).
193 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
194 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
195 Id. § 524(h).
196 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 572 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
197 Id. at 479.
198 MASS TORTS SUBCOMM., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS
CLAIMS ISSUES AND TRENDS 5 (2007).
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They did so, moreover, through a process—the “pre-packaged”
§ 524(g) reorganization—that was a step removed from the one that
lawmakers approved in § 524(g).199 This process is illustrated by the
bankruptcy of Combustion Engineering (CE).200 A former manufac-
turer of asbestos-lined boilers, CE was acquired by a Swiss conglom-
erate, ABB, in 1990.201 By the early 2000s, CE’s asbestos liability
posed a substantial threat to ABB’s financial health.202 In 2002, repre-
sentatives of ABB and CE negotiated an agreement with Joseph Rice,
a leading U.S. asbestos plaintiffs’ attorney who represented a substan-
tial inventory of claimants, that would conclusively resolve CE’s
existing asbestos liability.203
The agreement envisioned that CE would settle all of the
asbestos litigation currently pending against it and use a pre-
negotiated § 524(g) reorganization to limit future claims against the
company. To do this, CE agreed to establish two trusts: The first,
called the “CE Settlement Trust,” would pay claims that had been
asserted against CE by November 2002; the second, known as the
“Asbestos [Personal Injury] Trust,” would be established as part of a
§ 524(g) bankruptcy and used to pay future asbestos claims.204 A
channeling injunction issued by the bankruptcy and district courts
during the § 524(g) reorganization would protect the reorganized firm
from future asbestos claims by requiring that they be asserted against
the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust.205 Rice negotiated the terms of
the CE Settlement Trust himself but left the design of the Asbestos
Personal Injury Trust to be negotiated by CE and a “Future Claim-
ants’ Representative” that the company would select.206 CE promised
to pay Rice a $20 million “success fee” for his role in designing the
settlement.207
199 Pre-packaged plans—themselves a type of party-designed ad hoc procedure—
developed in non-asbestos bankruptcies like that of the overly-leveraged Southland
Corporation and migrated to § 524(g). See Stuart Silverstein, 7-Eleven Parent Files
‘Prepackaged’ Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-
25/business/fi-4478_1_prepackaged-bankruptcy (describing pre-packaged bankruptcies as
still a “new” and uncertain legal device).
200 See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004). The account that
follows draws from Mark D. Plevin, Robert T. Ebert & Leslie A. Epley, Pre-packaged
Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883, 898–907 (2003).
201 Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 203.
202 See id. (noting that “[b]etween May 2000 and March 2002, U.S. ABB contributed
$900 million in cash and other assets toward Combustion Engineering’s asbestos
obligations”).
203 Plevin et al., supra note 200, at 899.
204 Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 204–05.
205 Id. at 206.
206 Plevin et al., supra note 200, at 900.
207 Id. at 911.
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The process used to create the CE settlement differed from the
Manville reorganization in critical respects. When CE entered bank-
ruptcy, it was not initiating a process that would culminate in a reor-
ganization that resolved present and future asbestos claims against the
company. Instead, CE presented the court with a deal that had
already been negotiated among ABB, attorneys representing current
asbestos plaintiffs, and the future claimant’s representative. Instead of
the bankruptcy court appointing the future claimants’ representative,
CE selected the representative before filing a bankruptcy petition.
Present and future claimants were not subject to a single reorganiza-
tion plan, but channeled to different trusts whose structures and terms
were negotiated by different attorneys. The CE future claimants’ rep-
resentative played second fiddle, joining the negotiations after CE had
already pledged approximately half its assets to the CE Settlement
Trust to settle existing claims.208 And although the attorneys in the
Manville bankruptcy earned hefty fees, none was promised a success
fee like the $20 million Rice stood to gain.
On appeal from the district and bankruptcy courts’ orders
approving the plan, the Third Circuit concluded that future claimants
had not been adequately represented in settlement negotiations and
remanded for fact-finding on whether the settlement treated them
fairly.209 Nevertheless, the court of appeal’s decision had at best a
modest influence on the ultimate shape of the settlement. On remand,
the parties retained the settlement’s two-trust structure, but ABB
committed an additional $204 million to the Asbestos Personal Injury
Trust to pay future asbestos claimants.210 The lower courts approved
the new reorganization plan and issued a channeling injunction that
directed all future claims to the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust.
Apparently placated by ABB’s largesse, no party appealed from the
approval of the new reorganization plan. The parties thus succeeded
in leveraging § 524(g) to create a new pre-packaged approach to
resolving asbestos liabilities. That structure has become an industry
default, appearing in many other asbestos reorganizations.211
The departures from the Manville model in Combustion Engi-
neering and other § 524(g) bankruptcies show how an ad hoc proce-
dural statute that sought to retroactively bless a pre-existing workout
208 Id. at 901.
209 Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 202.
210 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Confirmation of Combustion
Engineering, Inc.’s Plan of Reorganization, as Modified Through October 7, 2005 at 8, In
re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. 03-10495 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2005).
211 See Plevin et al., supra note 200, at 893 (“[The] two-part structure . . . has now
become commonplace in pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcies.”).
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can evolve in future iterations of the originating procedural problem.
The end result is an “extrajudicial trust system” for resolving asbestos
liability whose fairness remains contested.212 The retroactive applica-
tion of § 524(g) to Manville’s pending bankruptcy made funds avail-
able to claimants, many in dire circumstances, that otherwise would
have gone to attorneys or secured creditors, and allowed Manville to
reorganize successfully. But it did so by singling out a favored class of
plaintiffs and defendants (those with asbestos claims) for special treat-
ment in response to sustained interest group lobbying, in a way that
failed to anticipate the second-order effects of Congress’s interven-
tion, highlighting the problems of legislative partiality, legislative
myopia, and special treatment. Although the normative valence of this
intervention is uncertain, its practical effect is not. With § 524(g), the
course of asbestos litigation in U.S. courts changed—irreversibly.
C. Collective Settlement in Europe: The Dutch Act on Collective
Settlement
As U.S. lawyers were seeking a legal vehicle that would deliver
peace in the asbestos crisis, a strikingly similar process was unfolding
in the Netherlands. The legislation that resulted, the Dutch Class
Action (Financial Settlement) Act (WCAM)213 is similar to § 524(g)
insofar as it allows claims from a mass harm to be directed to a
privately-negotiated compensation scheme. But the WCAM differs
from § 524(g) in ways that shed light on the normative objections to
ad hoc procedural legislation introduced in Part I.214
1. The Dutch DES Crisis
From 1947 to 1976, Dutch doctors prescribed a synthetic estrogen
known as diethylstilbestrol (DES) to pregnant mothers to prevent
miscarriage and premature birth.215 In the 1980s, studies linked DES
to heightened risks of breast and ovarian cancers.216 Thousands of
“DES mothers” and “DES daughters” filed lawsuits seeking compen-
sation from manufacturers. In 1992, the Dutch Supreme Court
removed the most significant legal obstacle to the plaintiffs’ claims
212 LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS 2 (2010).
213 Wet van 23 juni 2005 [WCAM] [Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act], Stb. 2005,
340 (Neth.).
214 See supra Section I.D.
215 See Lucas Bergkamp, Compensating Personal Injuries Caused by DES: “No
Causation Liability” in the Netherlands, 1 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 35, 35 (1994).
216 Id.
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when it adopted a variant of the “market share liability” theory217 and
held that Dutch DES manufacturers were subject to joint and several
liability where a plaintiff could not identify which specific manufac-
turer’s drug she took.218
Anticipating a flood of litigation, manufacturers and their
insurers began negotiations with potential plaintiffs. To organize the
negotiations, the Supreme Court appointed a foundation known as
the DES Centre to coordinate DES claims and directed plaintiffs to
“register” their claims with the foundation.219 Within six weeks of the
Supreme Court’s decision, “over 18,000 mothers, daughters and sons
had registered” with the foundation.220 Seven years of negotiation fol-
lowed among the DES Centre, Dutch DES manufacturers, and their
insurers.221 The insurers ultimately agreed to a thirty-five million euro
settlement, but insisted on a comprehensive release from liability.222
Like U.S. asbestos manufacturers and their insurers, the Dutch com-
panies wanted total peace.
Here, the negotiating parties faced a procedural problem.
Although the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure provided a mechanism
that allowed claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to be resolved
on a collective basis,223 the Code expressly barred collective actions
for monetary damages.224 Lacking a legal vehicle through which to
bind the entire universe of DES plaintiffs, the DES Centre and drug
manufacturers sought assistance from the Dutch Ministry of Justice,
the branch of government “responsible for [proposing] the lion’s share
of civil legislation in the Netherlands.”225 The Ministry “was very
much inclined to facilitate” the parties’ request.226 The Ministry had
previously been criticized for putting forward “ad hoc legislation” that
217 Market share liability allows plaintiffs to recover from defendants based on their
market share of a product that caused injuries in certain products liability cases when
specific causation cannot be established. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937–38
(Cal. 1980) (first adopting the theory in California), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
218 Bergkamp, supra note 215, at 35, 38.
219 CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN




223 Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands, in
AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPA¨ISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 171, 174 (Matthias Casper et al.
eds., 2009) (discussing contemporary Dutch case law on aggregation).
224 See id. at 175 (discussing changes to the 1992 Civil Code).
225 Bart Krans, The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, 27 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 281, 284 (2014).
226 Memorandum from I.N. Tzankova & D.F. Lunsingh Scheurleer, to Deborah Hensler
& Christopher Hodges 5 (Sept. 24, 2007) (on file with the New York University Law
Review) [hereinafter Memorandum from Tzankova & Scheurleer].
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applied to specific parties, however, and therefore proposed a law that
would provide a general framework for “the collective settlement of
mass damages.”227 Urgency to approve the DES settlement precluded
detailed consideration of the legislation. Although the Ministry of
Justice established “a commission of three distinguished Dutch civil
procedural lawyers” to review the treatment of collective actions
under Dutch law, the legislature passed the Ministry’s proposed legis-
lation before the commission completed its study.228
Enacted to provide a legal vehicle for the DES settlement, the
WCAM lacks any mechanism for resolving claims through adversarial
litigation.229 Instead, the statute, following the example of the DES
litigation, proceeds on the assumption that a private foundation and
defendant or group of defendants will negotiate a collective settle-
ment out of court, and turn to the judiciary to make their settlement
binding on a class of claimants after negotiations are complete.230
Like § 524(g), WCAM provided for its application in the
procedure-generating case. After the statute took effect, the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals approved the DES settlement and
ordered an opt-out period.231 Of the thousands of claimants who reg-
istered with the DES Centre, only one woman opted out.232 The
WCAM thus followed the familiar pattern of the Deutsche Telekom
Act and § 524(g). In contrast to § 524(g), however, the WCAM is not
227 Krans, supra note 225, at 284.
228 Memorandum from Tzankova & Scheurleer, supra note 226, at 5.
229 The absence of such a mechanism, a legislative summary wryly notes, “removes the
coercion inherent in an American-style class action, so that a defendant will not feel forced
into concluding this type of agreement.” THE DUTCH ‘CLASS ACTION (FINANCIAL
SETTLEMENT) ACT’ (‘WCAM’) 5 (2008), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/
rijksoverheid/documenten/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-class-action-financial-
settlement-act-wcam/wcamenglish.pdf [hereinafter WCAM SUMMARY].
230 Thus, the Act provides that a foundation may represent a group of claimants
provided that it “represents the interests of these persons pursuant to its articles of
association.” Id. at 1–2 (citing Art. 7:907 para. 1 BW). A settlement agreement may
resolve claims for losses that arise out of “a single event or similar events.” Id. at 2. Once a
foundation and defendant agree to a settlement, they jointly present the agreement to the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which gives notice of the settlement to claimants who may
be bound. The court reviews the settlement to ensure that the amount of compensation
awarded is “reasonable,” an independent party will divide compensation equitably among
claimants, and the foundation is “sufficiently representative” of claimants’ interests. Id.
(citing Art. 7:907 para. 3 BW). If the court approves the settlement, a second notice is
distributed to claimants, who may opt out within a court-specified deadline. Id. at 3 (citing
Art. 7:908 para. 2 BW). Following the opt-out period, the court enters judgment on the
settlement, which binds all claimants who do not opt out. Id.
231 HE´LE`NE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 & n.27 (2011); Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer et al., Global Settlement
Approved by Dutch Court, LEXOLOGY (July 17, 2009), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4ec6df79-30db-4e2f-b89d-6bed1cea946e.
232 WCAM SUMMARY, supra note 229, at 6.
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restricted to a specific type of claim or litigant. The only limitation on
the WCAM’s scope is that a settlement resolve claims that arise out of
“a single event or similar events.”233
2. The WCAM’s Reach Expands
In part because it was drafted in cross-cutting, trans-substantive
terms, the WCAM evolved from a vehicle for resolving mass torts into
one for resolving large-scale securities litigation. The case that laid the
foundation for this development grew out of claims against Royal
Dutch Shell.234
After Shell announced in January 2004 that it had overbooked its
oil reserves, U.S. plaintiffs filed putative class actions on behalf of a
worldwide class of investors in New Jersey federal court.235 From the
beginning of the litigation, a central point of contention was whether
foreign investors could participate in the U.S. litigation.236 While the
parties awaited a ruling from the district court on that question,
Shell’s General Counsel Beat Hess pursued a divide-and-conquer
strategy to the litigation. Hess negotiated a settlement with U.S. plain-
tiffs, while also devising a separate proposal to settle foreign investors’
claims using the WCAM.237 As Hess envisioned it, the parties would
negotiate and the Amsterdam court would approve a settlement that
bound investors worldwide, excluding only the claims of U.S. inves-
tors who were covered by the U.S. class action settlement.
The lawyers working on the foreign settlement feared that the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal would not be receptive to a settlement
where individual investors had not been represented in settlement
negotiations.238 Thus, they recruited Verninging van Effectenbezitters
(VEB), “a long-established Dutch association that is the public face of
smaller investors in the Netherlands,”239 to represent retail investors
in the settlement negotiations. In April 2007, Shell, VEB, and a spe-
233 Id. at 2.
234 Krans, supra note 225, at 285 (citing Hof Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, NJ 2009, 506
(Shell Petroleum N.V./Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Royal Dutch
Shell]).
235 Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws ¶ 56, In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712 (D.N.J. 2007) (No. 04-374).
236 See Deborah R. Hensler, A Class Action “Mash-Up”: In re Royal Dutch/Shell
Transport Securities Litigation, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE,
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 170, 175–76 (Deborah R.
Hensler et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the dispute over jurisdiction and noting the high
stakes of foreign investors).
237 Id. at 176–77. Hess was the former general counsel of ABB Group, the Zurich
conglomerate that played a prominent role in Combustion Engineering. Id.
238 Id. at 181.
239 Id.
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cially formed Dutch foundation petitioned the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal for approval of a settlement that would resolve all non-U.S.
investors’ claims for securities fraud in the overbooking of Shell’s oil
reserves.240
In a watershed decision, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal con-
cluded that it could exercise jurisdiction over foreign investors’ claims
because Shell was headquartered in the Netherlands and the inves-
tors’ claims related to Shell’s activities there.241 Reviewing the settle-
ment’s substantive terms, the court concluded that it provided a
reasonable amount of aggregate compensation and treated investors
equitably.242 The court approved the settlement, entered judgment on
it, and directed that investors be given three months to opt out.243 The
result was a worldwide class action settlement that excluded only U.S.
investors. In effect, the parties to the Royal Dutch Shell settlement
created a vehicle for resolving private securities litigation that com-
bined the preclusive effect of a U.S. class action settlement with uni-
versal jurisdiction.244
3. The Perils of Trans-Substantivity
Of the statutes considered in this Part, the WCAM does the most
to address the rule-of-law concerns that attend ad hoc procedural leg-
islation. Fearful that legislation limited to the DES case would be per-
ceived as a handout to a narrow interest group—thus raising
legislative partiality and special treatment problems—the Dutch
Ministry of Justice devised a mechanism that applied to any aggregate
settlement of claims that arose out of a single event or series of events.
Although the Ministry’s decision to propose a cross-cutting, trans-
substantive statute headed off claims of legislative favoritism, it had
serious unintended consequences, due in part to legislative myopia.
240 Id.
241 For a sworn translation of the decision of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in Royal
Dutch Shell, see SWORN TRANSLATION FROM DUTCH TO ENGLISH OF: DECISION BY THE
AMSTERDAM COURT OF APPEAL IN CASE NO. 106.010.887 RENDERED ON 29 MAY 2009
(2009), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Netherlands_
Shell_Decision_29May2009_%20ENG_translation.pdf.
242 Id. at 43–45, 60–61.
243 Id. at 60–61.
244 In the Converium case, the court of appeals took an even more expansive view of the
Dutch courts’ jurisdiction, basing jurisdiction over a Europe-wide class of investors on the
fact that Dutch investors were among those who purchased a Swiss corporation’s
securities. See Hof Amsterdam 12 november 2010, NJ 2011, 683 (SCOR Holding
(Switzerland) AG); Bart Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act in an
International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 CIV. JUST. Q. 141,
141–42 (2012).
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As many commentators have observed, the securities litigation
regime that emerged from the Royal Dutch Shell litigation seems to
undervalue plaintiffs’ claims relative to a system that also allows
claims to be resolved in an adversarial posture.245 The concern is mag-
nified by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s expansive view of its
jurisdiction. As interpreted by the court, a WCAM settlement may
bind a worldwide class of plaintiffs, effecting a “global class action
settlement.”246 Whether foreign courts will give preclusive effect to
such a settlement has yet to be litigated. But, commentators argue, the
Amsterdam court’s view of its jurisdiction likely exceeds the limits of
Dutch, E.U., and international law.247
It is improbable that a statute designed from the ground up to
facilitate private enforcement of securities laws would be designed in
this manner. Such a statute would more likely seek to create reason-
able incentives for claims to be settled at a fair value, and ensure that
judgments entered on a settlement were consistent with national and
international law. Because the Royal Dutch Shell regime was pieced
together from tools that were not designed to effect such settlements,
it is blind to these issues.
In the face of these complaints, parties’ continued willingness to
make use of the Royal Dutch Shell regime is striking. As of 2014,
seven applications for approval of a settlement had been brought to
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, six of which were granted.248 The
statute is often mentioned as a possible avenue for resolving securities
claims that are filed elsewhere, such as those in the Volkswagen clean
diesel securities litigation pending in Germany.249 And, while there is
reason to think that WCAM settlements undervalue plaintiffs’ claims
relative to a system where claims could be litigated, those settlements
improve on the status quo ante, in which plaintiffs who could not par-
ticipate in U.S. lawsuits lacked any mechanism for asserting claims on
a collective basis. In light of the lack of alternatives, plaintiffs in Royal
245 See, e.g., Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The
Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893, 926–27 (2012) (criticizing Dutch law for
relying on other legal systems to create a “defendant-friendly” class action settlement
environment).
246 Id. at 952.
247 See, e.g., Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective Action and Private International
Law Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global Aspirations and Regional Boundaries, 27
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 235, 259–62 (2014) (summarizing critiques).
248 Krans, supra note 225, at 282.
249 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 175, at 13–16.
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Dutch Shell reportedly “were satisfied with the outcome” of the
case.250
D. Enforcement of Judgments: The Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act
The statutes that we have discussed until this point addressed
problems that occurred before the entry of judgment and that arose,
at least to some extent, from the unique demands of aggregate litiga-
tion. But procedural problems and ad hoc statutory solutions arise in
other contexts as well. To illustrate, we close with a statute adopted to
address a problem in the post-judgment context, § 502 of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Iran Sanc-
tions Act).251
1. The Challenge of Seizing “Blips on a Computer Screen”
Section 502’s story begins with the October 1983 suicide bombing
of the Twenty-Fourth Marine Amphibious Unit’s barracks in Beirut,
Lebanon, which killed 241 servicemen and injured many others.252 A
federal district court later found that Iran had planned the attack and
perpetrated it via Hezbollah, the Lebanese political party and militant
group.253
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a
foreign state such as Iran is generally immune from U.S. courts’ juris-
diction, and the state’s U.S. assets are immune from execution unless
they are used for “commercial” purposes.254 Enacted in an effort to
regularize sovereign-immunity determinations, the FSIA establishes
standards for determining whether a foreign state enjoys sovereign
immunity and assigns the courts primary responsibility for deciding
that question.255
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)256 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA)257
250 Ianika N. Tzankova, Everything You Wanted to Know About Dutch Foundations but
Never Dared to Ask: A Check List for Investors 10 (Tilburg Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 04, 2016).
251 Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1214, 1258–60 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772).
252 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56–58 (D.D.C. 2003).
253 See id. at 51–53.
254 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); id. § 1605(a)(2).
255 See Samantar v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010).
256 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 2141–43 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605 (2012)).
257 Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337–40 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610 (2012)).
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eliminate this immunity for certain claims arising out of international
terrorism and delegate much of the decisionmaking power to the Pres-
ident, who is responsible for designating a state a sponsor of ter-
rorism.258 The FSIA thus already included specialized procedures for
cases involving foreign sovereigns that the President designated state
sponsors of terrorism.
Proceeding under AEDPA and TRIA, victims of the Beirut
attack and their heirs secured a $2.7 billion judgment against Iran in a
2003 case entitled Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran.259 Iran
removed most of its assets from the United States following the 1979
revolution,260 so the Peterson plaintiffs’ prospects for enforcing their
judgment were poor. In 2008, however, the plaintiffs learned from the
Treasury Department that Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi, owned
$2.1 billion in bonds in New York.261 The bonds were held at the
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation in New York and the New
York Federal Reserve Bank, and were payable to a New York
Citibank account maintained by Clearstream, a Luxembourg financial
intermediary.262 With the assistance of a New York-based judgment
enforcement specialist, the Peterson plaintiffs attached Iran’s interest
in the bonds.263 As soon as the attachments became public, other
plaintiffs who held judgments against Iran filed additional
restraints.264 Citibank filed an interpleader action to determine which
judgment holders, if any, were entitled to the bond proceeds.265
Although the bonds were merely “blips on computers,” they were
insulated from execution by Iran’s sovereign immunity as well as by a
“sandwiching” transaction that Iran executed in 2008.266 In that trans-
258 See id. § 201(a) (providing that assets of a terrorist party “shall be subject to
execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent
of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable”); id.
§ 201(d)(4) (specifying that the President may designate terrorist parties via the Export
Administration Act of 1979 and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
259 264 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (D.D.C. 2003).
260 See JAY SOLOMON, THE IRAN WARS: SPY GAMES, BANK BATTLES, AND THE SECRET
DEALS THAT RESHAPED THE MIDDLE EAST 164 (2016).
261 Julie Triedman, An Uphill Battle, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 2013, at 16, http://www.
americanlawyer-digital.com/americanlawyer-ipauth/201310ip?pg=15#pg15.
262 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518, 2013 WL 1155576, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013), aff’d, 758 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bank Markazi
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
263 Telephone Interview with Steven R. Perles, Senior Attorney & Founder, Perles Law
Firm, P.C. (Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Steven R. Perles].
264 Id.
265 Peterson, 2013 WL 1155576, at *1.
266 Triedman, supra note 261, at 16. To seize the bonds under FSIA’s terrorism
exception, plaintiffs had to show that the bond proceeds were located “in” the United
States, belonged to Iran, and were not used for central-banking purposes. Peterson, 2013
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action, Bank Markazi transferred its interest in the bonds to Banca
UBAE SpA (UBAE), an Italian bank controlled by Libyan dictator
Muammar Gaddafi,267 which undertook to pay the bond proceeds to
Markazi for a fee.268 UBAE’s presence in the payment stream
threatened plaintiffs’ ability to show that the bonds were owned by
Iran, as required to overcome Iran’s sovereign immunity. It also
threatened the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim to the bonds under
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs
securities intermediaries such as Clearstream.269 On June 23, 2009,
District Judge Barbara Jones issued an order observing that Clear-
stream was not the proper garnishee for creditors seeking the
bonds.270 Although Judge Jones continued the restraints on Clear-
stream’s Citibank account pending further proceedings, her order
implied that the Peterson plaintiffs’ only recourse was to go to Italy
and attempt to seize the bond proceeds before UBAE removed them
from the country.
2. Plaintiffs Turn to Congress
In light of the problem highlighted by Judge Jones’s order, the
Peterson plaintiffs decided, in the words of their attorney Steve Perles,
that seeking legislation was the “prudent thing to do.”271 A legislative
vehicle for a procedural fix appeared two-and-a-half years later, when
on December 14, 2011, the House passed a bill sanctioning Iran for
the continued development of its nuclear program.272
The bill moved to the Senate. On the day before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’ markup, Perles
arranged for victims of the Beirut attack to visit members of the
banking committee.273 At the markup, Senator Robert Menendez (D-
WL 1155576, at *7. TRIA provided an independent pathway through which plaintiffs could
seize the bonds, but required the plaintiffs to show the assets were owned by Iran. Id. at
*7–8.
267 Guy Dinmore, Rome Sits at Hub of Former Colony’s Web, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011),
https://www.ft.com/content/03878dca-45c8-11e0-acd8-00144feab49a.
268 Triedman, supra note 261, at 17.
269 Section 8-112(c) expressly addresses attachment of assets that are held by a
“securities intermediary” such as Clearstream. U.C.C. § 8-112(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1977). To protect third-party interests, § 8-112(c) provides: “The interest of a
debtor in a security entitlement may be reached by a creditor only by legal process upon
the securities intermediary with whom the debtor’s securities account is maintained.” Id.
(emphasis added).
270 Order at 1, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,
2009), ECF No. 171.
271 Telephone Interview with Steven R. Perles, supra note 263.
272 H.R. 2105, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 14, 2011).
273 Senate Banking Committee Unanimously Passes Amendments Critical to Beirut
Bombing Victims, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
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NJ) offered an amendment274 that addressed the “interests in financial
assets of Iran”275 and was accepted without dissent. As the sanctions
bill was reported by the Banking Committee, the Menendez amend-
ment authorized a broad array of U.S. plaintiffs, including victims of
other terrorist attacks and hostages held at the U.S. embassy during
the 1979 revolution, to seize assets that Iran held via securities
intermediaries.276
The provision, however, encountered an obstacle in the Senate
Financial Services Committee, whose members served as a conduit for
the views of the securities industry,277 with respect to this legisla-
tion.278 The securities industry’s objections do not appear in the public
legislative record, but their substance can be gleaned from an article
on the Iran Sanctions Act that appeared in Business Lawyer’s annual
survey of developments in the Uniform Commercial Code.279 As that
article explains, the Article 8 system is designed to allow an “upper-
tier intermediary” such as Clearstream to operate without knowledge
of lower-tier intermediaries’ dealings.280 A provision that allowed
assets to be restrained via upper-tier attachment orders that were
releases/senate-banking-committee-unanimously-passes-amendments-critical-to-beirut-
bombing-victims-138581524.html.
274 See 158 CONG. REC. S3318 (daily ed. May 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
275 S. 2101, 112th Cong. § 503 (as reported by S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, Feb. 13, 2012).
276 The Senate Banking Committee bill provided that—“[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, and preempting any inconsistent provision of State law”—Iran’s “interest
in securities or other financial assets” frozen in U.S. accounts “shall be deemed to exist at
every tier of securities intermediary necessary to hold an interest in any such securities or
other financial assets.” Id. § 503(a). Even when such an asset was held by a central bank, it
would be “deemed to be commercial activity in the United States and . . . shall be deemed
not to be held for the central bank’s or monetary authority’s own account.” Id. § 503(d).
The bill thus addressed the major obstacles to the Peterson plaintiffs’ efforts to execute on
the Iranian bonds frozen at Clearstream, in a manner that would have benefited any
creditor of Iran that sought to seize assets held at a securities intermediary. See id. § 503(e)
(specifying that the provision applied to any judgment against Iran for damages caused by
“torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking, or the provision of
material support or resources for such an act”).
277 Cf. CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, SAVING THE MARKET FROM ITSELF: THE POLITICS OF
FINANCIAL INTERVENTION 183 (2016) (noting the “substantial campaign donations from
financial actors” to the House and Senate Financial Services Committee members).
278 “[The] Financial Services Committee went nuts.” Telephone Interview with Jodi
Herman, Vice President for Gov’t Relations & Pub. Affairs, Nat’l Endowment for
Democracy (Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Jodi Herman]. When the
Senate received the bill passed by the House, it was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations. See 157 CONG. REC. S8601 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2011).
279 Carl S. Bjerre, Investment Securities, 69 BUS. LAW. 1215 (2014).
280 See id. at 1223 (explaining that “[t]he upper-tier intermediary does not know who its
‘customers’ customers’ are, let alone what individualized number or amount they hold of
which securities of which issuer, or how these holdings fluctuate from time to time, or what
control arrangements they are subject to”).
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“simply lobbed into this delicately arrayed lattice of relationships”
would “risk interfering with third parties’ property interests[ ] and
create associated systemic concerns” insofar as it caused parties to
doubt the Article 8 system’s integrity.281
Over the following months, the broader Iran bill was the subject
of intense negotiations among Senate leaders, the State Department,
and the White House.282 Negotiations on the Menendez amendment
proceeded among plaintiffs’ lawyer Perles, the securities industry, the
White House, the State Department, and the Department of Justice,
with Jodi Herman, Senator Menendez’s advisor, serving as go-
between.283 To address concerns about the amendment’s effect on the
Article 8 system, the negotiating parties agreed to narrow the amend-
ment’s scope.284 The final obstacle involved the distribution of bond
proceeds among Iran’s judgment creditors. If plaintiffs could not
agree among themselves how to divide up the proceeds of the bond,
Herman threatened, she would “pull the provision.”285 In May 2013,
plaintiffs reported that they had reached an agreement that provided
for an equitable distribution of the bonds proceeds.286 Under the
agreement, bonds proceeds would be available to judgment creditors
whose claims arose from the 1983 Beirut attack or the 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing, but it excluded judgment holders whose claims arose
from the 1979 hostage crisis.287 On May 21, 2012, the Senate passed an
amended version of the House’s Iran bill that was expressly limited to
“property that is identified in and the subject of proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
281 Id. at 1223–24.
282 See, e.g., Roberta Rampton, New U.S. Sanctions May Hinge on Iran Talks: Congress
Aides, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-sanctions-
idUSBRE83C19E20120413 (summarizing bill negotiations); Paul Richter, Obama
Administration Takes Back Seat on Iran Sanctions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/17/world/la-fg-us-iran-20120218 (same).
283 Telephone Interview with Jodi Herman, supra note 278.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Order Entering Partial Final Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Directing
Turnover of the Blocked Assets, Dismissal of Citibank with Prejudice and Discharging
Citibank from Liability at 5–6, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Peterson Judgment] (“[T]he Plaintiffs have agreed
among themselves to settle their competing claims with respect to the Blocked Assets.”).
287 See id. at 3; see also David M. Herszenhorn, 36 Years Later, Iranian Hostages Win
Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2015, at A1 (noting that a 2015 bill provided the first
compensation for victims of the 1979 hostage crisis); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Department of Justice Compensates Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-compensates-victims-state-sponsored-
terrorism (observing that hostages held during the 1979 revolution were compensated from
the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund pursuant to legislation enacted in
2015).
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Peterson,” and required the court to find that the property in the
intermediary account was “equal in value to a financial asset of
Iran.”288
Negotiations on the Menendez amendment continued when the
bill returned to the House. On August 1, 2012, the House passed the
2012 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. As further
amended, the statute contained a “rule[ ] of construction,” which
stated that the provision applied only to Peterson and discouraged
courts from drawing any inference from it about the meaning of the
Uniform Commercial Code.289 The House bill required the court to
find, before ordering turnover of the bond proceeds, that “no other
person possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the assets . . .
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.”290 The Senate passed the House bill without amendment, and
President Obama signed it into law on August 10, 2012.291
3. Section 502 Applied
With the new statute in hand, plaintiffs returned to the Southern
District of New York and renewed their motion for turnover of the
bonds, which by then had matured. The district court found that “[t]he
[n]ewest [a]ct”292 “swept aside” the defendants’ objections to turning
over the bond proceeds.293 Bank Markazi appealed, arguing that Con-
gress’s “overt” interference in the pending turnover litigation violated
Article III.294 The Supreme Court in Bank Markazi v. Peterson
rejected the Article III argument, concluding that § 502 validly
changed the law of sovereign immunity while the Peterson litigation
was pending rather than directing that the turnover action be resolved
288 H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 503 (as passed by Senate, May 21, 2012).
289 H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 502(c) (as passed by House, Aug. 1, 2012).
290 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158,
§ 502(a)(2), 126 Stat. 1214, 1259.
291 Actions Overview: H.R.1905—112th Congress (2011-2012), CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1905/actions (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
292 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518, 2013 WL 1155576, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013), aff’d, 758 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bank Markazi
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
293 Id. at *34. “Clearstream argue[d] that there [were] triable issues as to whether Bank
Markazi is the ‘owner of’ the Blocked Assets,” but § 502 made clear that the only question
was whether a party “other than an agency or instrumentality of Iran” held “a
constitutional, beneficial or equitable interest in the assets.” Id. at *30. Markazi’s argument
that the bond proceeds were immune from execution because they were not “in” the
United States failed because the new provision “obviate[d] any need for this Court to rely
on TRIA.” Id. at *24. The new provision required the court to “also find no central bank
immunity.” Id. at *26.
294 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 50, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.3d
185 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-2952).
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in a particular manner.295 The Court stressed that its decision was
informed by the political branches’ longstanding authority to control
“the disposition of foreign-state property in the United States.”296
In July 2013, the District Court ordered that the bond proceeds
be turned over to a trust for distribution to judgment creditors of
Iran.297 In October 2016—thirty-three years after the Beirut
bombing—the trust began distributions to the victims. Aside from a
small death benefit that the military provided, the disbursements rep-
resented the first financial compensation that victims of the bombing
ever received.298
4. Resolving a Specific Legal Dispute Through a Bespoke Statute
Section 502 unquestionably succeeded in its narrow goal of
ensuring that the Peterson judgment creditors could seize the bonds
that Bank Markazi inadvisably held in New York. As the district court
observed, the statute “swept aside” barriers to executing on the bonds
in the federal law of sovereign immunity. The statute’s substantive
standard—authorizing turnover if the district court found that “Iran
holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in” the bonds and
that “no other person possesses a constitutionally protected interest”
in the bonds—preempted the New York U.C.C. for the purposes of
the Peterson turnover litigation.299
As the Bank Markazi Court majority stressed, this intervention
can be seen as a routine exercise of legislative line drawing.300 Faced
with a choice between blindly adhering to the laws of sovereign immu-
nity and secured transactions, and these plaintiffs’ demands for com-
pensation, it is not difficult to understand why Congress provided the
legislative relief that plaintiffs requested, even though doing so raised
concerns that Congress was extending special treatment to victims of
the Beirut bombing and interfering in the ongoing Peterson
proceedings.
295 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (“By altering the law governing the attachment of
particular property belonging to Iran, Congress acted comfortably within the political
branches’ authority over foreign sovereign immunity and foreign-state assets.”).
296 Id. at 1328.
297 Peterson Judgment, supra note 286, at 6.
298 Telephone Interview with Jodi Herman, supra note 278.
299 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518, 2013 WL 1155576, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013), aff’d, 758 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bank Markazi
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
300 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326 (“[Section 502] provides a new standard clarifying
that, if Iran owns certain assets, the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks will be
permitted to execute against those assets.”).
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As the Chief Justice observed, however, § 502 was also enacted in
the midst of litigation that began in 2008. The statute “eliminate[d]
each of the defenses” that threatened plaintiffs’ effort to seize the
bonds.301 It was enacted in response to the plaintiffs’ lobbying, with
little opportunity for Iran or other judgment holders to make their
case—a clear example of legislative partiality. “And lest there be any
doubt that Congress’s sole concern was affecting the resolution of this
particular case, rather than establishing any generally applicable
rules,” the statute provided that nothing in it “shall be construed . . .
to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judg-
ment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceedings
other than” Peterson.302 Congress thus sought to foreclose any future
problems arising out of legislative myopia.
Section 502, then, presents an especially sharp example of the
possibilities and normative challenge of ad hoc procedural legislation
highlighted in the preceding case studies. If the statute solved the
problem of Iran successfully insulating its assets from execution, its
specificity and the context in which it was enacted also show the
extent to which ad hoc legislation can resemble the raw exercise of
state power that procedure ordinarily seeks to discipline and con-
strain.303 The legislation’s double aspect translated into the debate
over its constitutionality at the Supreme Court. Where the majority
concluded that the statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s legisla-
tive power, the Chief Justice argued that Congress had “assume[d] the
role of judge and decide[d] a particular pending case.”304 Nonetheless,
the actual reasons for the statute’s specificity were never ventilated
during the constitutional challenge to the statute. Herman related to
us that that, during the Supreme Court argument in Peterson, she
wanted to interject and explain that the statute’s specificity resulted
from the securities industry’s objections to a bill that overrode the
Article 8 holding system in more general terms.305 This aspect of the
statute’s history, however, is not apparent from the statute’s public
legislative history, and it was never presented to the Court.
301 Id. at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
302 Id. at 1333 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)).
303 See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) (“We have emphasized
time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government’ . . . whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental
procedural fairness . . . or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in
the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
304 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1332 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
305 Telephone Interview with Jodi Herman, supra note 278.
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III
AD HOC PROCEDURAL LEGISLATION IN A WORLD OF
ORDINARY LAW
As the first Part demonstrated, ad hoc procedure presents a mul-
tifaceted challenge to the traditional image of procedure. Enacted in
response to specific cases, ad hoc procedural legislation cannot claim
to be fair because lawmakers are ignorant of how their work will
affect specific litigants. Nor can fairness be assumed from ad hoc pro-
cedural legislation’s generality, given the extreme specificity of stat-
utes such as § 502 of the Iran Sanctions Act. When lawmakers seek to
accomplish specific litigation outcomes through apparent legislative
interference with pending litigation, the context in which that ad hoc
procedural legislation is enacted raises separation of powers concerns.
Nevertheless, the preceding Part demonstrated that, in addition
to inviting normative objections, ad hoc procedural legislation can
serve important purposes—most notably, restoring the civil justice
system’s ability to function in procedure-generating cases. But the
case studies do not provide a complete answer to whether ad hoc pro-
cedural legislation is legitimate. If statutes such as § 524(g) are benefi-
cial when viewed from the perspective of tort claimants and asbestos
manufacturers, they still pick winners and losers in a way that conflicts
with process-based accounts of the rule of law. The question remains:
When, if ever, are ad hoc procedural statutes a legitimate exercise of
the state’s power over civil procedure?
With the benefit of the initial examples Part I explored and the
case studies Part II examined, this Part returns to the normative chal-
lenge of ad hoc procedural legislation and considers whether it can
share the legitimacy of civil procedure that is established via the tradi-
tional ex ante model of procedural design. This Part argues that,
because of the differences in the design of ad hoc procedural statutes
and the reasons they were enacted, there is no across-the-board
answer to the normative objections to ad hoc procedural legislation
introduced in Part I. Instead, since the process that leads to ad hoc
procedural legislation provides no guaranty that it will be fair or well
considered, the legitimacy of any particular statute must be grounded
in other factors. Chief among these are the substantive fairness of the
outcomes that a statute seeks to bring about and the need for ad hoc
legislation to ensure the proper functioning of the justice system.
Section III.A begins by showing that the double aspect of ad hoc
procedural legislation that emerges from the case studies—its simulta-
neous tension with rule-of-law values and its necessary role in accom-
plishing important governmental objectives—is to some extent
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unavoidable. Many of the procedural problems that the case-study
statutes addressed could not be anticipated in generally applicable
statutes, nor could they be addressed through other forms of ad hoc
procedure-making. Lawmakers therefore faced a choice between
intervening on-the-fly and allowing a procedural problem to frustrate
the operation of the civil justice system. This dilemma suggests that
the normative problems introduced in Part I are not, alone, a reason
to reject ad hoc procedural legislation. Whether considering demands
for ad hoc procedural legislation ex ante or evaluating such legislation
ex post, courts and legislators cannot avoid balancing the need for ad
hocery against its costs.
Even when ad hoc legislation is warranted, its serious costs are
undeniable. As Section III.B shows, those costs result from two trade-
offs that lawmakers face in addressing procedural problems through
ad hoc procedural legislation. When determining the substantive scope
of an ad hoc procedural statute, lawmakers face a tradeoff between
limiting the statute to the motivating problem and extending the
statute more broadly: A narrowly tailored statute lowers the risk that
the statute will have unintended consequences but risks failing to treat
like cases alike; a broadly framed statute avoids singling out a
problem for special treatment but invites unintended consequences.
When determining the temporal reach of an ad hoc statute, lawmakers
face a tradeoff between operating prospectively and addressing
problems linked to a specific case or set of cases: A perfectly prospec-
tive statute avoids the unfairness of changing procedure midstream
but lacks the ability to respond to problems revealed by concrete
cases; a perfectly retroactive statute resolves specific problems per-
fectly, but undermines the aspiration that cases be decided under rules
that are established in advance of concrete disputes.
If the circumstances that ad hoc procedural statutes are enacted
within do not guarantee their fairness and such legislation carries sig-
nificant costs, can they be legitimate? In one sense, ad hoc procedural
legislation is the most legitimate form of ad hoc procedure-making
because it has the formal status of law under the relevant constitu-
tional norms. But an ad hoc statute’s formal status as law does not
answer the rule-of-law-based objections to ad hoc procedure-making,
which recognize that an enactment may formally be law while failing
to comply with the rule of law because it is arbitrary, discriminatory,
or established through a process that invites lawmakers to legislate for
bad reasons.
Section III.C argues that an ad hoc procedural statute’s legiti-
macy depends on the perception that that the statute is necessary to
ensure the continued functioning of the civil justice system and that it
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strives to do justice in response to that procedural problem. Ad hoc
legislation thus depends upon a different kind of legitimacy than gen-
erally applicable procedural codes: A given statute’s legitimacy or lack
thereof lies in its justification and equity, not the fact that it results
from a process that tends to produce evenhanded procedure. Because
these aspects of a statute are so important to its legitimacy, the trans-
parency of the legislative process that leads to the enactment of the
statute is critical.
A. The Inevitability of Balancing
We began in Part I with the challenge that ad hoc procedural leg-
islation presents to the traditional model of procedural design and the
rule-of-law values that model reflects. Enacted to overcome proce-
dural problems revealed by a case or set of cases, ad hoc procedure
departs from the traditional model of procedural design, which seeks
to ensure the fairness of state action by resolving disputes through
evenhanded processes established in advance of concrete disputes.
The departures are particularly striking in the context of ad hoc proce-
dural legislation, which not only changes the “rules of the road” for
ongoing cases but also threatens traditional dividing lines between
judicial and legislative functions. If avoiding the appearance of legisla-
tive partiality were the only metric for judging procedure-making, ad
hoc procedural legislation’s departures from the traditional model
would be conclusive objections against it.
The case studies show, however, that procedure designed on the
traditional model cannot address all of the problems that in practice
can frustrate the operation of the civil justice system. Even the most
clairvoyant procedural designer could not have anticipated the flood
of claims precipitated by Deutsche Telekom’s IPO,306 the litigation
dynamics that prevented the U.S. legal system from resolving the
flood of asbestos litigation in the 1980s,307 the need for global peace
created by the Dutch Supreme Court’s resolution of DES manufac-
turers’ liability,308 or Iran’s maneuvering to make use of the U.S.
financial system while protecting its assets from judgment creditors.309
For the civil justice system to offer the goods that it ordinarily pro-
vides in these types of cases, some amount of ad hoc procedure-
making was necessary.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 130–43.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 5–14.
308 See supra text accompanying notes 215–22.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 266–70.
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Of course, ad hocery does not have to take the form of legisla-
tion.310 In recognition of the limits of human foresight, most proce-
dural codes confer discretion on judges and authorize parties, by
agreement, to tailor procedures to a case’s specific needs.311 When
case-specific procedure-making fails to overcome a problem, legisla-
tures may redirect claims to an administrative scheme, or a claims
facility may be established to provide an alternative to public court
litigation.312 For certain problems, however, changes to existing proce-
dures provide the most attractive—and sometimes the only—way to
overcome procedural problems.313
Legislation is perhaps the most powerful form of ad hoc proce-
dure, but the barriers to obtaining it are high. It is no coincidence that
all of Part II’s case studies involved procedural problems that arose in
the course of high-stakes complex litigation, involving sophisticated
lawyers and well-resourced parties with access to the key political
players. Whether the actors who pursued the profiled statutes judged
that existing law provided too little authority to frontline decision
makers,314 needed a statute to bind third parties,315 or sought legisla-
tion for some other reason,316 their repeated, successful attempts to
persuade legislatures to adopt new procedural statutes suggest ad hoc
procedural legislation will be a persistent feature of the procedural
landscape.
If one accepts the legitimacy of the objectives that motivated Part
II’s case studies, as we generally do,317 it is clear that ad hoc proce-
dural legislation’s departures from the traditional model of procedural
design cannot be conclusive objections to it. An important point fol-
lows. Whether considering a proposal to enact an ad hoc procedural
statute ex ante or evaluating the statute ex post, legislatures, courts,
and observers of their work cannot avoid balancing the need for the
legislation against the costs of ad hoc procedure-making. To treat ad
hoc procedure statutes’ departures from the traditional model of pro-
310 See supra text accompanying notes 67–111 (categorizing different forms of ad hoc
procedure).
311 See supra text accompanying notes 67–78.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 79–111.
313 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting that “real
reform” requires “federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution
scheme” (citing AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 27–35 (1991))).
314 See supra text accompanying notes 154–75 (discussing the Bundestag’s codification
of the test case procedure developed by the DT trial court).
315 See supra text accompanying notes 16–20 (discussing the channeling of asbestos
claims to a freestanding trust via § 524(g)).
316 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598.
317 The PLRA raises a potential exception. See supra text accompanying notes 112–18.
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cedural design as fatal defects, as the Bank Markazi dissent does,318 is
to deny the seriousness of the problems that inspire the legislation. To
accept ad hoc procedural legislation simply because it is law—the
tenor, if not holding, of the Markazi majority opinion319—is to deny
the serious rule-of-law concerns that such legislation raises. Balancing
is inevitable.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court reached an analogous conclu-
sion in the 1960s and 1970s when addressing due process challenges to
agency adjudication schemes that departed from the procedures fol-
lowed by public courts. After suggesting in Goldberg v. Kelly that due
process requires agency adjudication schemes to follow the basic fea-
tures of public court procedure,320 the Court quickly reversed course
and concluded that novel agency procedures are consistent with due
process if they are supported by a sufficiently compelling justifica-
tion321 and ensure “fundamental fairness.”322 As famously articulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge, a due process challenge to New York City’s
procedures for terminating Social Security disability benefits, this
calculus depends upon “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action,” “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and “finally, the Govern-
ment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.”323 The Court’s adoption of this “cost-ben-
efit formula”324 was premised on its recognition that whether a chal-
318 See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1333 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“There has never been anything like § [502] before. Neither the majority nor
respondents have identified another statute that changed the law for a pending case in an
outcome-determinative way and explicitly limited its effect to particular judicial
proceedings.”).
319 See id. at 1327 (denying that “there is something wrong with particularized legislative
action” and reasoning that “[w]hile legislatures usually act through laws of general
applicability, that is by no means their only legitimate mode of action” (quoting Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995))).
320 See 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (“[Due process] principles require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his
own arguments and evidence orally.”).
321 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–49 (1976).
322 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
323 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. For a skeptical analysis of whether the Mathews factors
capture the relevant costs and benefits, see generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
324 Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1353 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1241 (1997).
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lenged procedure is “constitutionally sufficient” depends on the
“governmental and private interests that are affected.”325 Con-
demning a novel procedure simply because it departed from the pro-
cedures followed in public court would ignore one side of that
balance.
B. The Dynamics of Ad Hoc Procedural Legislation
To say, as the preceding section suggests, that ad hoc procedural
legislation is inevitable is not to say that it is costless. Rather, the
necessity of balancing the costs and benefits of ad hoc legislation sug-
gests that such legislation is virtually certain to carry costs. Part I.C
introduced costs that result from ad hoc procedural legislation’s
departures from the traditional model of procedure-making. Other
costs highlighted by Part II’s case studies result from the tradeoffs that
legislatures face when considering demands to enact ad hoc proce-
dural legislation.
1. The Generality Tradeoff
The first of these tradeoffs arises from the distinctive interest-
group dynamics of ad hoc procedural legislation.326 The groups that a
procedural problem affects—securities fraud plaintiffs and judges
responsible for hearing their claims, asbestos plaintiffs and defen-
dants, DES manufacturers and individuals harmed by their prod-
ucts—are prototypically adverse to one another in litigation. A
procedural problem, however, may deny litigation adversaries a good
or package of goods that they seek from litigation, such as a mecha-
325 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
326 For the standard account of interest-group politics in the United States, see MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965). For refinements of Olson’s account that demonstrate how the enactment
of legislation gives rise to interest groups that influence the demand for new legislation and
constrain Congress’s ability to modify existing law, see, for example, JEB BARNES &
THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS, COURTS, LITIGATION, AND
THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (2015) (describing injury compensation
cases as examples of interest-group advocacy through litigation), ANDREA LOUISE
CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2003) (analyzing the reciprocal relationship between
political participation and policy with respect to the civic engagement of senior citizens),
and Paul Pierson, The Study of Policy Development, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 34 (2005)
(advocating for greater analysis of how policy develops in order to understand how new
legislation may become either a durable policy regime or a fleeting initiative). But see
Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics
of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243 (2004)
(questioning the thesis that legislative entitlements universally “stick” and explaining
strategies through which opponents of the welfare state may exploit the stickiness of
legislation to lower the level of state-provided risk protection).
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nism for binding an entire universe of claimants through an aggregate
settlement.327 A procedural problem can therefore provide the occa-
sion for a shotgun wedding, as litigation adversaries temporarily unite
in a group to seek out legislation that advances their several inter-
ests.328 Compared to usual players in the litigation process, these liti-
gation “interest groups” are small. Prototypically, they consist of the
parties to an ongoing case that a procedural problem affects.
That small interest groups enjoy a comparative advantage in pur-
suing legislation has been a staple of political economy since Mancur
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action.329 A small group’s size, and the
fact that its members are directly affected by legislation, help to over-
come the collective action problems that are thought to prevent indi-
viduals with shared policy preferences from mobilizing legislative
action.330 The billions of dollars at stake in cases that spawn ad hoc
procedural legislation justify the investment in the lobbying needed to
secure it.
These interest-group dynamics, however, shape the record for
lawmakers considering ad hoc procedural fixes in ways that impact
legislative design. On the bright side, a group seeking an ad hoc proce-
dural statute has strong incentives to present lawmakers with a
detailed picture of the procedural problem that the group seeks to
overcome. The group’s members also have a strong incentive to
develop legislation that treats members of the group fairly, in order to
prevent defections from the temporary coalition. In the Manville
bankruptcy, for example, parties on all sides of the proceeding—
asbestos claimants, the future claims representative appointed by the
district court, Manville’s managers, and the trustees of the Manville
personal injury trust—came together to support § 524(g) when it was
presented to Congress.331 The legislation they proposed reflected the
bargain that had been negotiated among the asbestos plaintiffs’ law-
yers, the court-appointed future claims representative, and Manville
during earlier stages of Manville’s reorganization. It is only where par-
327 See supra text accompanying notes 5–14 (discussing the inability of ordinary
procedural tools to bind claimants in asbestos-related litigation).
328 See McKenzie, supra note 182, at 1014–15.
329 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 326.
330 Olson theorized that small groups are “twice blessed in that they have not only
economic incentives, but also perhaps social incentives, that lead their members to work
toward the achievement of the collective goods.” The social incentives involved pressure to
contribute and be seen as contributing to the group’s common work. “The large, ‘latent’
group, on the other hand, always contains more people than could possibly know each
other, and is not likely (except when composed of federated small groups) to develop
social pressures that would help it satisfy its interest in [obtaining] a collective good.”
OLSON, supra note 326, at 63.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 187–92 (discussing 1992 hearings on § 524(g)).
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ties to the procedure-generating case have differential access to the
legislative process that ad hoc legislation will tend not to represent a
compromise among their interests. In the case of the PLRA, state and
local prison and law-enforcement authorities overpowered the voices
of those representing the unpopular prison inmate population,
resulting in legislation that critics see as one-sided and that, all agree,
establishes restrictive litigation rules applicable only to prisoner
litigants.332
If ad hoc procedural legislation is likely to reflect a compromise
among the litigants who seek it, it is unlikely to take third parties’
interests into account. A litigation group that puts forward a proce-
dural fix for a legislature’s consideration has little incentive to draft
legislation that does more than solve the immediate problem it faces,
to develop information about the proposal’s effects on strangers to the
procedure-generating case, or to present that information to the legis-
lature.333 To the contrary, drafting a statute that is broader than
needed to overcome the procedural problem, or articulating its effects
on third parties, decreases the likelihood that the statute will be
enacted by inviting objections from third parties. Accordingly, ad hoc
legislation will tend to be narrowly drawn, and to be indifferent to its
effects on third parties—inviting legislative myopia with respect to the
statute’s long-run consequences.
Even if other kinds of litigation present a comparable procedural
problem, drafters of the ad hoc legislation are unlikely to address it.334
And while a proposed statute might be drafted to address obvious
constitutional objections,335 this hardly ensures that all of the constitu-
encies the statute affects will be treated fairly. As noted above,
asbestos manufacturers objected to § 524(g) on the ground that it
332 See Fan, supra note 101, at 610 (explaining that the PLRA “imposed high hurdles for
prison population reduction orders in part because of a controversial prisoner reduction
consent decree in Philadelphia”).
333 In this sense, the groups who seek ad hoc legislation are similar to coalitions that
devise settlements that resolve an immediate controversy at the expense of non-parties. Cf.
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763–65 (1989) (holding that non-parties to a settlement
cannot be precluded from challenging it in later proceedings).
334 Interestingly, practitioners have told us anecdotally that now that § 524(g) has
legitimized use of the channeling injunction in bankruptcies involving asbestos liability,
debtors with other kinds of liability have been able to take advantage of similarly
structured channeling injunctions issued under the authority of Section 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. on Civil Justice & N.Y. Univ. Law Review,
Center on Civil Justice Fall 2016 Conference: The Effectiveness of Rule 23, YOUTUBE 39:00
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://youtu.be/CmSTFtvKGw4 (comments of Sheila Birnbaum, Esq.).
335 See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing how § 524(g) was drafted to
avoid violating the Bankruptcy Clause).
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would force them into bankruptcy. When § 524(g) became law, it had
precisely this effect.
These dynamics create a tradeoff between legislating narrowly, as
Congress did in the Iran Sanctions Act, and extending an ad hoc inter-
vention beyond the motivating case, as the Dutch legislature did in the
WCAM.336 Narrow legislation reduces the risk of unintended conse-
quences at the cost of failing to treat like cases alike and appearing to
dole out a legislative favor to the group that sought the legislation.
Thus, the Iran Sanctions Act’s extreme specificity led the Chief Justice
to complain that Congress had “assume[d] the role of judge and
decide[d] a particular pending case in the first instance.”337 Legislation
cast at a higher level of generality avoids the appearance of legislative
favoritism at the cost of inviting unintended consequences. The
WCAM’s trans-substantivity, for instance, enabled it to form the foun-
dation of the securities regime created in Shell. Likewise, the MDL
statute’s trans-substantivity enabled it to form the foundation for the
controversial current system of resolving mass torts through massive
non-class aggregations and aggregate settlements.338
2. The Retroactivity Tradeoff
The second tradeoff presented by proposals for ad hoc proce-
dural legislation involves the costs of changing procedural rules mid-
stream. As Part I explained, ad hoc legislation is enacted by
lawmakers who are aware of—and generally intend—specific litiga-
tion outcomes. Lawmakers’ awareness of how legislation will affect
pending cases, and the fact that they do not act based on recommen-
dations of nominally impartial experts, strips ad hoc procedural legis-
lation of the presumptive fairness of procedure that is established
through the traditional model of procedure-making. For example,
Congress’s awareness of the likely effects of the Iran Sanctions Act
raises separation-of-powers concerns.
That ad hoc procedural legislation changes the procedure used to
resolve legal claims distinguishes it from other types of legislation and
underscores the normative challenge of legislating on the fly. Virtually
all legislation has distributional implications.339 But procedural rules
336 See also supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text (discussing the MDL statute).
337 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1332 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
338 See generally Bradt, supra note 95 (summarizing debates over this use of the MDL
statute).
339 Madison observed:
[A] body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet
what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but
concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different
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aim to treat all sides fairly, and the perceived fairness of dispute reso-
lution procedure is central to the legitimacy of legal judgments, as Part
I noted.340 Thus, there is a difference between lawmakers’ awareness
of how ad hoc procedural statutes affect litigants and, say, lawmakers’
awareness of how amendments to the Clean Air Act will affect power
companies.
Lawmakers presented with a proposal for ad hoc legislation
might seek to allay these concerns by specifying that legislation
applies prospectively, or even delaying its effective date.341 Doing so
eliminates the objection that the legislature is meddling in ongoing
litigation, but compromises legislation’s ability to address procedural
problems in ongoing cases. The DT Act would be of little use if it
could not be used in the DT litigation. Nor would § 524(g) have been
attractive to Manville if it could not have been used in Manville’s
restructuring.
Lawmakers thus face a tradeoff between changing procedural
rules midstream, inviting charges of legislative favoritism, and solving
problems that arise in specific cases. To the extent that legislation
operates prospectively, its capacity to address problems revealed in
specific cases is diminished. When legislation operates retrospec-
tively—or just in time to address the problem—it is in tension with the
aspiration that cases be decided according to procedures established
ex ante, and with separation-of-powers norms that attempt to distin-
guish between legislative and judicial functions. But a legislature
cannot solve problems in pending litigation and operate exclusively on
a prospective basis.
3. Balancing, Quickly and for Keeps
The tradeoffs that we have just highlighted—between specificity
and generality, prospectivity and retroactivity—are endemic to legisla-
tion.342 But the circumstances under which ad hoc procedural statutes
are enacted make them particularly unlikely to resolve those tradeoffs
optimally.
classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they
determine?
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
340 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing social psychologists’
findings on the factors that contribute to acceptance of legal decisions).
341 See generally Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled
Commitments, and Carbon Taxes, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 130 (Frank Fagan &
Saul Levmore eds., 2017) (surveying advantages and drawbacks of sunrise legislation in the
context of pollution policy).
342 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY
STATE §§ 1[C][1]–[2] (2015) (discussing tradeoffs between regulation and common law,
and rules and standards).
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Posit that lawmakers considering ad hoc legislation work in good
faith. Even so, the short time frame in which ad hoc legislation is
developed means that they will have little time to consider—and
negotiate—the shape that the legislation takes. For example, pressure
to enact the WCAM was so great that the Dutch legislature could not
wait for a report on the legislation from a commissioned panel of civil
justice experts.343 Section 502 of the Iran Sanctions Act was part of a
broader sanctions bill that navigated the legislative process in eight
months, an impressive accomplishment in an era of partisan
gridlock.344 Such pressure decreases the likelihood that lawmakers
strike the optimal balance between generality and specificity and
between prospectivity and retroactivity.
Even though ad hoc procedural legislation tends to be enacted in
a hurry, the balance lawmakers strike is likely to endure because it is
formalized in law.345 And the very formality of ad hoc procedural leg-
islation invites sophisticated legal actors to put ad hoc statutes to uses
that the drafters and proponents of the legislation did not anticipate,
as lawyers did with § 524(g).346 As explained above, Congress sought
to retroactively bless the procedures used in the Manville bankruptcy
in § 524(g), and to make those procedures available to other asbestos
manufacturers that faced the prospect of a stream of asbestos claims
extending indefinitely into the future. The statute, however, provided
the legal basis for a new legal structure for stripping a company of
asbestos liability—the pre-packaged § 524(g) bankruptcy.347 A review
of the committee hearings on § 524(g) shows that lawmakers did not
consider or affirmatively approve that structure.348 As Combustion
Engineering suggests, sophisticated actors’ use of ad hoc procedural
legislation in unexpected ways magnifies the risk of responding to pro-
cedural problems revealed by particular cases with ad hoc legislation.
343 See Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in 622 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 155 (Deborah Hensler et al. eds., 2009).
344 On February 1, 2012, Senator Robert Menendez introduced the original version of
what would become § 502. The section became law, as amended, on August 10, 2012. See
supra notes 275–91.
345 See generally JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30850, MINORITY
RIGHTS AND SENATE PROCEDURES (2005) (describing rules that empower minorities in the
Senate to delay or prevent new legislation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron,
Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–49 (2008) (describing how vetogates in
the federal legislative process increase the difficulty of enacting new legislation and
decrease the likelihood that legislation, once enacted, will be amended or repealed).
346 Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011) (concluding
that the enactment of the Federal Clean Air Act completely displaced common law
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions).
347 See supra text accompanying notes 199–211.
348 See House Manville Hearings, supra note 23; Senate Manville Hearings, supra note 8.
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Seen from this perspective, the Bundestag’s inclusion of a sunset
clause in the DT Act was prescient. Recognizing that it was acting
under intense time pressure and with imperfect information, the
Bundestag effectively forced reconsideration of the DT Act at a later
time, when more information would be available and the legislature
was not under the gun to resolve the Frankfurt court’s “mutiny.” The
changes that resulted from the forced reconsideration of the statute, in
turn, were a major factor in making the statute an attractive vehicle
for the Volkswagen securities litigation.
Sunsetting, however, reflects a bet that a future legislature will be
able to identify problems with the ad hoc statute and address them
effectively—a questionable assumption when it comes to, say, the cur-
rent U.S. Congress. The possibility of a failure to act at the time of the
sunset can create uncertainty and result in losing the benefits of the ad
hoc procedure as a fix for future iterations of similar issues. Where a
legislature’s membership changes, moreover, sunsetting implicates
risks of legislative drift: Tomorrow’s legislature may reject the original
legislature’s judgment that a procedural problem warrants an ad hoc
fix.349 Thus, while the sunset device accomplished its goals in the DT
Act, it is no cure-all.
C. Can Ad Hoc Procedural Legislation Be Legitimate?
We are left with ad hoc procedural legislation’s abiding ambiva-
lence. Ad hoc procedural legislation is formally law. For this reason,
there is no question that it can direct courts to apply new forms of
procedure and modify third parties’ rights subject to constitutional
constraints. But as we have shown, the circumstances in which ad hoc
procedural legislation is enacted do little to guarantee that it is fair. It
inevitably involves balancing rule-of-law values against the apparent
need to fix procedural problems to enable the justice system to func-
tion. Moreover, it entails serious costs that result from the timeframe
in which it is enacted and the tradeoffs that legislatures face in
attempting to fix problems revealed by specific cases. All this raises
questions of legitimacy. Ad hoc legislation can work rough justice.
Can it also share the legitimacy of codes, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, established through the traditional model?
349 See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503–04
(1989) (sketching the phenomenon of legislative drift). For a discussion of how legislative
drift can influence other forms of procedure-making, see David L. Noll, Regulating
Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1011–17, 1036 (2017).
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For reasons we have already suggested, that legitimacy cannot
rest entirely on ad hoc legislation’s formal status as enacted law. To be
sure, ad hoc legislation is subject to debate in Congress, and both par-
ties to the procedure-generating litigation and outsiders to it have a
formal opportunity to participate in the debates over the bill. Such
legislation thus contrasts with ad hoc procedures created through judi-
cial fiat or party agreement. But ad hoc procedural legislation is
unlikely to reflect a robust debate among diverse interest groups. It is
special interest legislation insofar as it results from a narrow interest
group’s demand for legislation that advances the group’s interest.350 It
results from unorthodox lawmaking, because it tends not to proceed
through the legislature in the manner assumed by textbook accounts
of the legislative process.351 This process stands in contrast to the pro-
cess that led to framework procedural statutes such as the Enabling
Act.352
Nor is the legitimacy of ad hoc procedural legislation guaranteed
by the fact that it survives judicial challenges alleging violations of
constitutional separation-of-powers and due process norms. In the
United States, the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits Congress
from requiring that judgments be reviewed by an executive depart-
ment, reopening final judgments, or directing the resolution of a
pending case.353 But as Bank Markazi illustrates, those norms leave
Congress room to intervene in litigation in ways that “dictate judicial
results.”354
350 See supra note 326 (listing theoretical treatments of interest-group politics).
351 See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016) (discussing lawmaking that does not
follow the textbook legislative process); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure, 165
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (analogizing unorthodox legislation to the development
of precedent in multidistrict litigation).
352 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1035–95 (1982) (chronicling the decades-long lobbying effort that culminated in passage of
the Enabling Act); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. L. REV. 1557, 1675–77 (1995)
(summarizing the lobbying effort that culminated in the Administrative Procedure Act);
see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950) (describing the
Administrative Procedure Act as the product of “a long period of study and strife; it settles
long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing
social and political forces have come to rest”). But cf. Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar,
Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1346–49 (2014) (arguing that the legal
structure of the modern administrative state reflects compromises and developments
inextricably linked to the effort to mobilize the nation for World War II).
353 See supra note 116 (describing doctrinal developments since United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)).
354 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1334 n.2 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Due process might seem to exert a stronger influence on the
design of ad hoc procedural legislation. In Amchem and other cases,
courts have elaborated a set of principles grounded in the Due Process
Clause that check against self-dealing by class counsel and seek to
ensure the fairness of distributional choices made by designers of class
settlements and judgments.355 As summarized by Judge Anthony
Scirica in Sullivan v. DB Investments, these principles of “structural,
procedural, and substantive fairness” aim to achieve “redress of inju-
ries, procedural due process, efficiency, horizontal equity among
injured claimants, and finality.”356 They require that individuals
bound by an aggregate resolution receive competent and conflict-free
representation, that settlement proceeds be allocated fairly among
beneficiaries, and that proceedings be free of collusion among
adversaries.357
These principles have never been held applicable to legislation,
however. Quite the contrary, the Court in Amchem opined that a suc-
cessful resolution to the asbestos litigation crisis “required federal leg-
islation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution scheme” and
pointed to the Federal Black Lung Program as a model for such legis-
lation.358 The Court’s preference for a legislative solution to the
asbestos crisis reflects the unstated belief that a resolution required
essentially political judgments about how to allocate asbestos manu-
facturers’ scarce assets among a sprawling class of claimants. The fed-
eral courts, “lacking authority to replace state tort systems with a
national toxic tort compensation regime,” could not make those judg-
ments, but Congress could.359
As Amchem teaches, the factors that contribute to ad hoc proce-
dural legislation’s legitimacy differ from the factors that legitimate
ordinary procedural law and court-created workouts. A legislative
355 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–27 (1997) (holding that class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that class members’ interests be aligned with
their putative representative); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–37
(1999) (same; Rule 23(b)(1)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–42 (1940) (holding that
binding inadequately represented non-parties to a judgment violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). For a survey of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
and the difficulties lower courts have encountered implementing it, see Morris A. Ratner,
Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 788 (2017).
356 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring).
357 See id.
358 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598.
359 Id. at 599; see Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency
Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1640 (2017) (observing that “[f]or years, the Supreme
Court and scholars have said that legislative bodies are better than judges at responding to
problems of mass harm”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and
the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 173–74 (2003) (developing
analogy between mass settlement grids and legislative compensation schemes).
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solution to the asbestos litigation crisis was preferable in large mea-
sure because other strategies for addressing the crisis had failed.360
While an ad hoc legislative fix would necessarily depart from the pro-
cedures followed by public courts and the processes of procedure-
making that generated them, there was no realistic alternative. During
the asbestos crisis, the Court correctly recognized, the choice was
between procedural improvisation and the continued failure of the
civil justice system.361
We do not mean to suggest that ad hoc procedural legislation is
permissible only as a last resort. It must however be necessary in the
sense of being supported by a sufficiently compelling justification for
legislative action. Though no single type or category justification is
strictly required, the statutes with the strongest claim to legitimacy—
the DT Act and § 524(g), for example—address the civil justice
system’s failure to provide a good that it provides in run-of-the-mill
litigation. On the other hand, the statutes that appear the most intui-
tively problematic—such as the PLRA and § 502 of the Iran Sanctions
Act—went beyond restoring the civil justice system’s ability to func-
tion and set up new, specialized procedures for covered claims. Much
of the criticism directed at the PLRA is directed at the perceived arti-
ficiality of the procedural problem with prisoner litigation that led to
the statute, and the overzealous “fix” that singles out prisoner litiga-
tion for particularly harsh treatment.362
If necessity is an important determinant of an ad hoc statute’s
legitimacy, it is not sufficient. An ad hoc statute that, say, erected an
untenably high burden of proof for asbestos-based personal injury
claims might have ended the asbestos litigation crisis, but only at the
cost of disrupting expectations of compensation that followed from
pre-existing law. This example points to a second condition for ad hoc
procedural legislation’s legitimacy: that the statute seek to produce
substantively just results. An ad hoc statute cannot claim to treat liti-
gants even-handedly because it is enacted behind a veil of ignorance.
Thus, one cannot escape evaluating the fairness of the litigation out-
comes that it tends to produce. Statutes that seek to produce substan-
tively just results will be perceived as more legitimate than those that
do not. This observation explains some of the unease that § 502 of the
Iran Sanctions Act generates. Few would argue that allowing ter-
rorism victims to recover for their injuries is substantively unjust, even
360 See supra text accompanying notes 9–21; Section II.B.1.
361 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (describing “the elephantine
mass of asbestos cases” and remarking that “this litigation defies customary judicial
administration and calls for national legislation”).
362 See supra text accompanying notes 112–18 (discussing criticisms of the PLRA).
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 41 Side A      10/12/2017   08:00:42
39546-nyu_92-4 Sheet No. 41 Side A      10/12/2017   08:00:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-4\NYU401.txt unknown Seq: 73 10-OCT-17 14:40
October 2017] AD HOC PROCEDURE 839
if providing compensation is in tension with traditional notions of sov-
ereign immunity. But § 502 did more. It ensured that a specific class of
assets—the Clearstream bonds—went to a specific class of litigants—
the Peterson plaintiffs—to the detriment of other judgment creditors
of Iran.363 The only check against unjust distributions in the statute
was the requirement that no other party have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in the funds that went to the Peterson plaintiffs.
Because ad hoc legislation’s legitimacy turns on whether it seeks
to produce substantively just results, the process through which it is
made matters. Ad hoc legislation is applied and reviewed by courts,
affects litigants, is observed by the public, and may form a precedent
for future legislative interventions. All of these actors scrutinize the
legislation’s fairness. All else being equal, they are more likely to view
a statute favorably if they can discern the legislature’s reasons for
acting and the reasons for the design choices reflected in the statute.
Accordingly, a developed legislative record can bolster the specific
type of legitimacy implicated by ad hoc procedural legislation. In con-
trast, statutes that are enacted without a developed legislative record
are intuitively more troubling, even if they serve valid ends. Depar-
tures from the traditional model of procedure-making in ad hoc legis-
lation will appear less problematic—to both judicial and lay
audiences—if legislatures explain the necessity for ad hoc legislation,
and their choices in designing the particular legislation.
If lawmakers would do well to explain their reasons for how and
why they adopt ad hoc legislation, however, courts should be sensitive
to tradeoffs between the necessity for legislation and legislative trans-
parency in ad hoc legislation. The example of § 502 shows that legisla-
tive decisions that appear to reflect extreme favoritism toward a
particular group of litigants may in fact be explained by innocuous
reasons—in the case of § 502, the desire to avoid interfering with the
UCC indirect holding system. We do not suggest that ad hoc proce-
dural legislation is immune from constitutional scrutiny. But courts
should hesitate before concluding that choices reflected in such legis-
lation lack an articulable basis.
*  *  *
We conclude 180 degrees from where we began. From the per-
spective of traditional procedural theory, ad hoc legislation appears
likely to be motivated by politics rather than by a genuine desire to
resolve claims fairly and efficiently. But in statutes such as § 524(g)
and the WCAM, legislative intervention was needed to secure merits
363 See sources cited supra note 287.
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resolutions that the legal system could not provide using ordinary
tools of procedure.
Ad hoc legislation that is limited to the motivating litigation also
creates special-purpose rules, raising concerns about singling out a
specific group for special treatment and creating transaction costs for
litigants and courts. The limited scope of an ad hoc procedural statute
may reflect the informational and cognitive limitations of legislatures
that are asked to approve an ad hoc fix on the fly, and a reasonable
reluctance to tinker with generally applicable law. The legislature’s
active involvement in shaping rules of dispute resolution procedure
threatens the traditional separation of functions between legislatures
and courts. But in statutes including the WCAM, DT Act, and
§ 524(g), courts and highly motivated lawyers were incapable of over-
coming procedural problems that created a need for ad hoc legisla-
tion. Ad hoc legislation changes rules of dispute resolution procedure
midstream and is unlikely to reflect a systematic analysis of how the
civil justice system should operate. But broader, cross-cutting legisla-
tion—which is subject to systematic analysis—gives rise to procedural
problems that call for ad hoc solutions.
Although ad hoc procedure may appear suspect from the per-
spective of traditional procedure, it is now an important part of how
states respond to complex legal problems that overwhelm the capaci-
ties of pre-existing rules of dispute resolution procedure. The fact that
procedural legislation is “ad hoc” signals that it is a different kind of
procedure, not that it necessarily is illegitimate.
POSTSCRIPT: THE PERSISTENCE OF AD HOC PROCEDURE
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez crashed into the Bligh Reef
off the southern coast of Alaska, setting off a spill that released some
eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound.364 After the
Valdez crash, three other major spills occurred within the year.365 The
spills focused public attention on the shortcomings of the federal regu-
lation of oil tankers, as well as the legal framework that governed the
consequences of a spill.366 Successfully containing the environmental
364 ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF OIL 1 (1990).
365 Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 482 (2000).
366 See Anne C. Mulkern, How Long to Pass an Oil Spill? Try 18 Months, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/12/12greenwire-how-long-to-pass-
an-oil-spill-bill-try-18-mont-13939.html (“Prior to 1989, there were [sic] a series of different
regulations covering different kinds of spills. The effort to create one regulation that
covered all spills had stalled in Congress because of disagreement over federal pre-
emption.”).
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and economic damage caused by an oil spill requires quick cash trans-
fers to the affected communities.367 But Exxon stonewalled; it ulti-
mately spent decades fighting lawsuits seeking damages for economic
loss.368
Within months of the crash, the immediately apparent legal and
regulatory failures pushed oil spill legislation to the top of the 101st
Congress’s agenda. Seventeen months after the crash, President
George H.W. Bush signed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).369
The 1990 Act imposed new design standards for oil tankers oper-
ating in federal waters and raised the liability limits for damages
caused by oil spills, which had previously been limited to double the
value of the vessel after a crash. Animated by Exxon’s lethargic
response to the Valdez disaster, the Act established a new system of
private financing for oil spill recovery efforts based on the principle,
“You make the mess; you clean it up.”370 When a spill occurred, the
President, acting through the Coast Guard, would designate a
“responsible party” that was obligated to finance the cleanup effort
and pay interim claims for damages.371 In an effort to avoid the
expense and delay of public-court litigation, the Act required litigants
to present claims to the responsible party before filing suit.372 To
backstop private financing, the Act authorized new excise taxes to
fund the Federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which would fund
cleanup efforts and pay damages claims when the responsible private
party was insolvent or the damages from a spill exceeded the OPA’s
liability limits.373
The Act’s effort to ensure that the responsible party paid cleanup
costs and claims without drawn-out litigation was frustrated by
Congress’s failure to address the legal consequences of accepting pay-
ment from the responsible party in the original OPA. In January 1996,
the North Cape barge crashed off the coast of South Kingstown,
Rhode Island. Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) took to the Senate
floor to explain that fishermen and lobstermen who had lost their live-
367 See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 364, at 155 (“What is required in a
successful oil spill response is to blend the resources of state, federal and industry response
teams into an effective organization, and to provide sufficient manpower and resources to
make a significant attack on the spill within 24 hours.”).
368 See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A
Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 25 (2009) (describing the two-
decade-long Exxon Valdez litigation).
369 Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–19).
370 145 CONG. REC. 4691 (1999) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (discussing 1999
amendments to the OPA).
371 33 U.S.C. § 2714(a).
372 Id. §§ 2705(a), 2713.
373 See id. § 2712.
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lihoods as a result of the crash were reluctant to present claims to the
claims facility created by the barge’s owner, because they feared that
accepting a claim for interim damages would waive their right to
pursue future compensation.374 To address the waiver problem,
Senator Chafee proposed amendments to the OPA that formalized a
responsible party’s obligation to establish a procedure for the
“[p]ayment or settlement of a claim for interim, short-term dam-
ages.”375 Accepting such a payment would not prejudice the
claimant’s right to pursue “damages not reflected in the paid or settled
partial claim.”376 In October 1996, Congress passed Chafee’s amend-
ments in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996.377
Between 1990 and 2006, responsible parties and the Oil Spill
Liability Trust paid between $860 million and $1.1 billion in fifty-one
“major” spills to finance cleanup efforts and compensate injured par-
ties.378 Of that amount, responsible parties “paid between about 72 to
78 percent of these costs.”379 Yet, even as revised by the Chafee
amendments, the OPA still failed to provide a framework that could
successfully manage claims from a Valdez-scale spill successfully.
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, killing
eleven crew members and setting off a three-month-long spill that
released an estimated 200 million gallons of crude into the Gulf of
Mexico.380 In the face of intense political pressure from the President
and the public, BP agreed on June 16, 2010, to waive the OPA’s
seventy-five million dollar liability cap for oil spills from an “offshore
facility,”381 and to set aside twenty billion dollars, payable in part from
future drilling off the Gulf Coast, to pay for damages caused by the
Deepwater Horizon explosion.382 Memorializing its informal agree-
ment with the President, the company ran a series of newspaper
advertisements that pledged BP was “determined to do everything we
374 142 CONG. REC. 26,523–25 (1996) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
375 S. 1730, 104th Cong. § 201(a) (as reported by Sen. Chafee, June 26, 1996).
376 Id.
377 Pub. L. No. 104-324, § 1142(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3901, 3991 (1996) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 2705(a)).
378 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-795T, OIL SPILLS: COST OF MAJOR
SPILLS MAY IMPACT VIABILITY OF OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST FUND 3 (2010).
379 Id.
380 John M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html.
381 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3).
382 See Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion to Help Oil Spill
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1; Jonathan Weisman, BP Blunted U.S. Demand,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2010, at A1.
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can to minimize any impact” from the Deepwater Horizon spill.383
Said the company: “We will honor all legitimate claims.”384
Making good on this commitment presented a formidable proce-
dural challenge. BP initially sought to process claims through a “Gulf
Coast Claims Facility” (GCCF) managed by Kenneth Feinberg, the
special master who successfully oversaw the September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund.385 Just as in the North Cape crash, however, the
availability of a claims facility failed to head off public-court litigation.
As Feinberg “paid out an eye-opening $6.2 billion to more than
220,000 claimants” during the first eighteen months of the GCCF’s
operation, plaintiffs’ lawyers organized a campaign to sign up clients
and persuade them to file claims in court.386 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated tort claims before Judge Carl
Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.387 While Feinberg promised Gulf Coast residents that the
GCCF would provide the same compensation as courts without the
need for a lawyer and in a shorter timeframe, plaintiffs’ lawyers
charged that Feinberg was working hand in glove with BP to minimize
the costs of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.388 Competition between
Feinberg and the trial bar spilled into Judge Barbier’s court, as plain-
tiffs’ counsel complained that Feinberg was violating ethics rules by
interfering in their relationship with potential clients.389 On February
2, 2011, Judge Barbier ordered Feinberg to “[f]ully disclose to claim-
ants their options under OPA if they do not accept a final pay-
ment.”390 Thanks in part to Judge Barbier’s order, thousands of
383 PATRICIA SWANN, CASES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS MANAGEMENT: THE RISE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA AND ACTIVISM 218 (2d ed. 2014).
384 Id.
385 See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a
Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—a Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 820–21
(2011). On Feinberg, see Ashby Jones, Spotlight on Ken Feinberg: The Special Master of
America, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2010), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/14/spotlight-on-
ken-feinberg-the-special-master-of-america.
386 Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 400 (2014).
387 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20,
2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Securities cases were consolidated before
Judge Keith P. Ellison in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division. See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 721 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
388 Mullenix, supra note 385, at 872–78.
389 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supervise Ex Parte Communications
Between Defendant and Putative Class Members at 9, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (complaining that “[t]he GCCF has repeatedly endangered the
rights of the putative class members to be properly informed of the facts surrounding the
oil spill and the manner in which their rights will be affected”).
390 Order and Reasons at *8, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the
Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011).
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plaintiffs elected not to make use of the GCCF and filed claims via
counsel that were transferred to Judge Barbier for pre-trial
management.391
The “amorphous collection of claims” consolidated in Judge
Barbier’s court presented fresh procedural problems.392 Confronting a
public relations disaster and claims filed by the Federal EPA and state
attorneys general, BP faced intense pressure to pay legitimate claims.
Plaintiffs and their counsel sought to maximize the damages they
extracted from BP. The court sought to avoid the zombie dockets and
institutional dysfunction that defined the U.S. courts’ response to the
asbestos litigation crisis.393
To streamline litigation, Judge Barbier made use of an ad hoc
procedure first devised in earlier multidistrict litigation: He appointed
a plaintiffs’ steering committee (PSC) to coordinate litigation of
Deepwater Horizon claims.394 The PSC, joined by BP, proposed to
“organize[ ] the relevant claims into ‘pleading bundles’” that would
establish the litigation’s general structure.395 Instead of filing a com-
plaint that repeated the allegations of earlier complaints, a plaintiff
would join one of three “master complaints” that governed claims for
personal injury, economic loss, and property damage.396 Barbier “had
never before heard of” pleading bundles and noted the term did not
appear in the Manual for Complex Litigation.397 He explained, how-
ever, that “[w]e are creating something here,” and approved the joint
proposal, invoking his authority to manage the multidistrict litiga-
tion.398 With the litigation structured along the lines established by the
pleading bundles, BP agreed to a series of class action settlements that
resolved much of its liability from the Deepwater Horizon spill.399
391 Richard Blackden, Is BP Still America’s Most Hated?, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/8461870/Is-BP-still-
Americas-most-hated.html (describing the “frenzy of filing” before the statute of
limitations ran).
392 Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of
Multidistrict Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 237 (2011).
393 See supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text.
394 See Order and Reasons at *1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in
the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 1464908 (E.D. La. Apr. 15,
2011). On PSCs, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.62 (2004).
395 Order and Reasons at *1, In re Oil Spill, 2011 WL 1464908; see also Alejandro de los
Rios, Barbier Approves Pleading BP Claims into ‘Bundles,’ LA. REC. (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://louisianarecord.com/stories/510580438-barbier-approves-pleading-bp-claims-into-
bundles.
396 Order and Reasons at *3, In re Oil Spill, 2011 WL 1464908; see also de los Rios,
supra note 395.
397 De los Rios, supra note 395.
398 Id.
399 See Ratner, supra note 355, at 809–21 (discussing the settlement classes).
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Among them was an uncapped settlement for economic loss claims
that cost BP billions of dollars.400
The Oil Pollution Act’s history powerfully illustrates the forces
that necessitate ad hoc procedure-making and the difficulty—if not
the impossibility—of avoiding it. With each change to the procedures
that apply in the aftermath of a spill, from the 1990 Oil Pollution Act
to Judge Barbier’s innovations in the Deepwater Horizon litigation,
policymakers sought to ensure that claims from oil spills would be
processed in a manner that minimized environmental and economic
harm, paid legitimate claims, and contained spills’ financial impacts.
These actors’ efforts were not based on systematic analysis of civil liti-
gation in U.S. courts, or even oil spill litigation, but on defects in the
architecture of the law that specific crises revealed: the lack of a mech-
anism to ensure quick cash transfers to communities affected by the
Valdez spill, the need to clarify the effect of accepting an interim
award, and the need to coordinate prosecution—and resolution—of
the thousands of claims that arose out of the Deepwater Horizon dis-
aster. If policymakers’ efforts have a seat-of-the-pants quality that sits
uncomfortably with traditional images of judicial impartiality and pro-
cedural regularity, they also reflect an effort to ensure that the civil
justice system does not repeat the failures of the asbestos litigation
crisis. Unable to address the procedural problems of oil spill litigation
using the preexisting processes of law, litigants, lawyers, judges, and
lawmakers move back and forth among different forms of procedural
ad hocery: legislation such as the Chafee amendments, special-
purpose entities such as the GCCF, judicial orders, and agreements
negotiated by lawyers. The thread that connects these efforts is the
felt necessity of changing procedural rules of the road just in time to
solve procedural problems.
As this Article has shown, ad hoc procedure presents a deep chal-
lenge to the traditional model of civil procedure that has long under-
pinned the legitimacy of state action in civil litigation. At the same
time, ad hoc procedure-making bolsters the civil justice system’s legiti-
macy by ensuring that procedural problems do not prevent it from
functioning. In highlighting the tension between these two sources of
legitimacy, we have aimed to show the pervasiveness and persistence
of ad hoc procedure, and the importance of understanding ad hoc pro-
cedure’s role in the civil justice system.
400 See Paul M. Barrett, Spillapalooza: How BP Got Screwed in the Gulf, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, July 1–July 7, 2013, at 52, 54.
